

PEARL HARBOR
AND THE KIMMEL CONTROVERSY:
THE VIEWS TODAY

**A Colloquium
at the U.S. Navy Memorial**

**Sponsored by
the Naval Historical Foundation
December 7th, 1999**

PEARL HARBOR AND THE KIMMEL CONTROVERSY: THE VIEWS TODAY

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Naval Historical Foundation

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Seventy-five years ago, Commodore Dudley Knox wrote in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* about the “glaring deficiencies” in collecting and preserving the Navy’s written records. Knox’s article on “Our Vanishing History and Traditions” gave birth to the Naval Historical Foundation in 1926 under the sponsorship of the Secretary of the Navy. From its initial focus on safeguarding the material culture of the Navy, the NHF has developed into a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving and promoting the full range of naval history. Today, in addition to providing much needed support to the Navy’s historical programs and its flagship Navy Museum in Washington, DC, the NHF collects oral histories of Navy veterans from World War II through the Cold War, and publishes articles and sponsors symposiums on important naval history topics. To provide increased access by the public to the Navy’s historical collections of art, artifacts, documents and photographs, the NHF provides historical research and photo reproduction services through its Historical Services Division.

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In the late 1990's, author, decorated World War II submariner, Capt. Edward "Ned" Beach, Jr. proposed that a colloquium be held to review the issue of accountability at Pearl Harbor. Beach, who served on the Naval Historical Foundation's Board of Directors, had long argued that the naval commander at Pearl Harbor, Adm. Husband Kimmel, had been unfairly blamed for losses in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. It was Beach's intention to line up a list of speakers to affirm his assertion. However, the new president of the NHF, Vice Adm. Robert F. Dunn, wanted a more balanced program. Thus, the NHF hosted a colloquium on the 58th anniversary of the attack in 1999. Titled "Pearl Harbor and the Kimmel Controversy: The Views Today," the all-day program held at the Navy Memorial brought together many of the nation's top Pearl Harbor scholars holding diametrically opposing views to discuss command responsibility and accountability.


The all-day 1999 program featured presentations and commentary from then NHF president Vice Adm. Robert F. Dunn; former Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Adm. Thomas A. Brooks; naval historian Dr. Sarandis Papadopoulos; Director, National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History David Hatch; former Deputy Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet Vice Adm. David C. Richardson; author of *Pearl Harbor Revisited*, Dr. Robert W. Love; author of *Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor*, Capt. Edward L. Beach, Jr.; Former commanding officer of battleship *Iowa*, Capt. Larry Seaquist; former Chief of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency Rear Adm. Mac Showers; author of *Combined Fleet Decoded*, Dr. John Prados; naval analyst Norman Polmar; Dr. David A. Rosenberg; and the Distinguished Professor of Leadership, U.S. Naval Academy, Adm. Henry G. Chiles.

Program

8:00 – 9:00 AM	Check in and refreshments
9:00	Welcome
	Rear Admiral McKinney
Program introduction	
	Vice Admiral Dunn
9:05	Participant introductions and program context
Rear Admiral Brooks	
9:15	Media treatment of the controversy
Dr. Papadopoulos	
9:25	Cryptologic background
Mr. Hatch	
9:35	Presentations
Vice Admiral Richardson	
Dr. Love	
Captain Beach	
Captain Seaquist	
10:55	Break
11:05	Panel discussion
Dr. Prados	
Rear Admiral Showers	
Mr. Polmar	
Dr. Rosenberg	
12:00 PM	Questions from audience
12:35	Summation
Admiral Chiles	
12:50	Closing comments
Vice Admiral Dunn	
1:00	Wreath laying ceremony, Navy Memorial
1:30	Refreshments, National Archives Reception Room

Colloquium Participants

RADM Hank McKinney	President and CEO, U.S. Navy Memorial Foundation and Naval Heritage Center
VADM Robert F. Dunn	President, Naval Historical Foundation
RADM Thomas A. Brooks	Former Director of Naval Intelligence
Dr. Sarandis Papadopoulos	Assistant Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University
Mr. David Hatch	Director, National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History
VADM David C. Richardson	Former Commander, US Sixth Fleet and Deputy Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet
Dr. Robert W. Love	Professor of History, US Naval Academy and author of <i>Pearl Harbor Revisited</i>
CAPT Edward L. Beach	Author of <i>Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor</i>
CAPT Larry Seaquist	Former commanding officer of four Navy ships, including the battleship <i>USS Iowa</i>
RADM Mac Showers	WWII intelligence analyst and former Chief of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dr. John Prados	National security historian and author of <i>Combined Fleet Decoded</i>
Mr. Norman Polmar	Naval analyst, historian and co-author of <i>Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Intelligence</i>
Dr. David A. Rosenberg	Admiral Harry W. Hill Professor of Maritime Strategy, National War College
ADM Henry G. Chiles	Distinguished Professor of Leadership, US Naval Academy



United States Navy Memorial



Preface

This colloquium reviewed events surrounding the December 7th, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, with a focus on the actions of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. A series of official inquiries between 1941 and 1946 blamed Admiral Kimmel and the Commander of the Army Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Short for the lack of readiness at Pearl Harbor that morning. Though neither officer was ever officially charged with wrongdoing, both were relieved of their commands immediately following the attack and later retired at their permanent, lower ranks of Rear Admiral and Major General—apparently the only two officers who served in WWII who were not ultimately retired at the highest rank they held.

Recent attention in Congress and the media has brought the issue to prominence once more. Admiral James L. Holloway III, the chairman of the Naval Historical Foundation, understanding the significance of Pearl Harbor in world history, saw an opportunity for the Foundation to perform a public service by hosting a forum for proponents and opponents of exoneration to air their views. Also by attracting media attention, the forum served to remind Americans about what happened at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Before reviewing the following proceedings, readers should be aware that this colloquium was not designed to be an academic conference but rather a free-wheeling exchange of views between individuals with diverse backgrounds and points of view. A researcher studying the issues surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack would be best served by using these proceedings to obtain an overview of some of the key questions at hand to lead the way to the primary source documents and previously written scholarly narratives on the subject. The speakers who argued for or against exoneration may have presented few new revelations about the debacle, but they did effectively mine the current scholarship to support their arguments. Consequently, if one wants to explore the debate about accountability at Pearl Harbor, the following proceedings of the colloquium are a most germane and thought provoking place to begin.

The Proceedings

The Colloquium commenced shortly after 9 AM in the auditorium of the Navy Memorial's Naval Heritage Center. Rear Admiral Hank McKinney, USN (Ret.) President of the hosting Navy Memorial Foundation, welcomed the attendees and introduced the President of the Naval Historical Foundation: Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn.

VADM ROBERT F. DUNN, USN (RET.): [Welcome and background]:

As President of the Naval Historical Foundation, I want to welcome all of you today to the Navy Memorial and to our colloquium, "Pearl Harbor and the Kimmel Controversy: the Views Today." I would particularly like to thank Rear Admiral Hank McKinney and the staff here at the Navy Memorial for the superb support they have provided in hosting this event. I want to recognize Admiral Jim Holloway, former Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of our Naval Historical Foundation, and General Andy Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Not in our audience today is Ned Kimmel, the son of Rear Admiral Kimmel who wrote to me: "...reluctantly, I most respectfully decline to accept your invitation.... This is not because of my lack of interest in the colloquium, far from it, but because of concern that the presence of Kimmel family members among those present might in some way influence the presentations or panel discussion as well as any conclusion the colloquium may draw from them."

On 26 November 1941, a Japanese fleet centered around six aircraft carriers departed in strictest secrecy from the Kurile Islands for Hawaii. At dawn 7 December 1941, the task force had approached undetected to a point slightly more than 200 miles north of Oahu. At 6:00 a.m., the Japanese carriers launched a first wave of 181 planes. Even as they winged south, some elements of U.S. forces on Oahu realized there was something different about this Sunday morning.

In the hours before dawn, U.S. Navy vessels spotted and attacked an unidentified submarine periscope near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. At 7:00 a.m., an alert operator of an Army radar station at Opana spotted the approaching first wave of the attack force. The report of the submarine attack was handled routinely, and the radar sighting was passed off as an approaching group of American planes due to arrive that morning.

The Japanese aircrews achieved complete surprise when they hit American ships, airfields and military installations on Oahu shortly before 8:00 a.m. Of the more than 90 ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor, the primary targets were the eight battleships anchored there. Seven were moored on Battleship Row along the southeast shore of Ford Island while one lay in drydock across the channel. Within the first minutes of the attack all the battleships adjacent to Ford Island had taken bomb and or torpedo hits. The USS *West Virginia* (BB-48) sank quickly. The USS *Oklahoma* (BB-37) turned turtle and sank. At about 8:10 a.m., the USS *Arizona* (BB-39) was mortally wounded by an armor piercing bomb which ignited the ship's forward ammunition magazine. The resulting explosion and fire killed 1,177 crewmen, the greatest loss of life on any ship that day and about half the total number of Americans killed. The other battleships also suffered varying degrees

of damage in the first half hour of the raid.

When the attack ended shortly before 10:00 a.m., less than two hours after it began, the American forces had paid a fearful price. Twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were sunk or damaged. Aircraft losses were 188 destroyed and 159 damaged, the majority hit before they had a chance to take off. American dead numbered 2,403. That figure included 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded. Japanese losses were comparatively light. Twenty-nine planes, less than 10 percent of the attacking force, failed to return to their carriers.

The Japanese success was overwhelming, but it was not complete. They failed to damage any American aircraft carriers, which by a stroke of good fortune, had been absent from the harbor. They neglected to damage the ship repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, which played an important role in the Allied victory in World War II. American technological skill raised and repaired all but three of the ships sunk or damaged. Most importantly, the shock and anger caused by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor united a divided nation and was translated into a wholehearted commitment to victory in World War II.

This colloquium will review events surrounding the Japanese attack with a focus on the action of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. A series of official inquiries between 1941 and 1946 blamed Admiral Kimmel and the Commander of the Army Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Short for the lack of readiness at Pearl Harbor that morning. [See Appendix A]

Though neither officer was ever officially charged with wrongdoing, both were relieved of their commands immediately following the attack and later retired at their permanent, lower ranks of Rear Admiral and Major General—the only two officers who served in WWII who were not ultimately retired at the highest rank they held. Subsequent attention focused on this issue has not altered that situation.

Were national and military leaders too quick to render judgment? Were Kimmel and Short responsible to some degree for the disaster, or were they made scapegoats in the rush to hold someone accountable? Were there failures at higher levels of the chain of command in Washington? Where does the blame for the lack of military readiness lie? Does the analysis of declassified intelligence information since WWII justify a reevaluation of the promotion status of the two officers? These questions have been debated for over a half-century and for many Americans, “Remember Pearl Harbor” now calls to mind the Kimmel-Short controversy as much as the Japanese surprise attack.

Before I turn the action over to the moderator, I will remind you that at the completion of this colloquium, we will join the Commandant, Naval District Washington and Rear Admiral McKinney at the Navy Memorial’s Lone Sailor statue to observe as they lay a wreath to remember those who died 58 years ago today. Immediately following that ceremony, those of you who desire may gather with us across the street in the National

Archives reception room to continue, in an informal manner, the discussions of this issue. We will have complimentary sandwiches and drinks to refresh you after the rigors of this colloquium.

I would now like to introduce Rear Admiral Tom Brooks, former Director of Naval Intelligence, who will serve as our moderator this morning.

RADM THOMAS BROOKS, USN (RET.): [Ground rules and overview of positions]

Thank you very much Admiral Dunn, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. It is my privilege to act as moderator today. I would like to take a few minutes to explain the mechanics of the colloquium, in addition to introducing the participants here on stage with me. I will only introduce them very briefly at this moment and as they take their turn to speak or participate in the panel, I will introduce them in more depth.

To my right is Vice Admiral Dave Richardson. He will be our first speaker. Admiral Richardson is a distinguished naval aviator, and former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as well as Sixth Fleet Commander. Next to Admiral Richardson is Captain Ned Beech, a very distinguished World War II and subsequent to World War II submariner, and very well known author. We have an empty chair, but we are expecting Professor Bob Love of the History Department of the Naval Academy, I guess he has been delayed. And then at the end we have Captain Larry Sequist, a surface warfare officer, and former commander of the battleship *Iowa*.

On my left we have Admiral Mac Showers who spent World War II in Station Hypo in Hawaii. Next, Commander in the Naval Reserve, but otherwise, Professor Dave Rosenberg. Next to him is the very well known author and naval historian and authority on things naval, Norman Polmar, and then another very well known author, John Prados at the very end. These will form our panel.

I will introduce the rest of the speakers and participants as they take their place, and I will give further introductory remarks as the people here on stage have an opportunity to speak.

The issue of responsibility for U.S. naval forces being taken by surprise by Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has persisted since the day of the attack, 58 years ago today. As Admiral Dunn pointed out, and you have a handout in the folder that has been provided to you, it has been a subject of nine official investigations, innumerable books, and the issue is still as controversial and emotional one today despite the passage of almost 60 years.

The issue has coalesced around the proposition that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were unfairly treated, and should be restored to their highest rank held. This is an issue of such complexity that we could not hope to do it justice in the four hours we have allotted to us today. All we can hope to accomplish is to air some views, exchange some thoughts, perhaps stimulate some thoughts, and perhaps stimulate additional research as

additional material becomes available or is made available primarily either by the U.S. Government or the British Government.

If we are going to accomplish this at all today, it is critical that we stay on schedule, and that will be my major reason for being here. From time to time, you will see me flashing cards of various colors at the speakers telling them time is ticking down and it is time to move on. I will be rather unmerciful doing it. But if we don't do this, not everybody will have a chance to be heard.

I would ask the members of the audience who would like to ask a question or interject a thought, to hold that until the end. We will have, if I do my job right, 30-35 minutes of opportunity for questions and answers or input from the audience. For those who still would like to conduct further discussion, as Admiral Dunn pointed out, we will reconvene at 1:30 in the National Archives Building across the street and be able to continue the dialogue.

That concludes my introductory remarks as to the mechanics of the colloquium. All of you have a program. The general format will be a couple of introductory papers being presented and then we will have the four primary speakers: a pro-con, pro-con in true debating society format. We will then take a break. It is listed as a 10-minute break. All of these people filing out and using two small bathrooms, will be a challenge in ten minutes, but I will try to ensure that we break on time.

We will then have questions, inputs, observations, by the panel, and then questions from the audience. The summation will be conducted by Admiral Chiles, who was previously introduced by Admiral Dunn. Admiral Dunn will make the closing remarks and we will adjourn for the wreath laying.

Before I turn over the microphone, I have been asked to provide in a nutshell the spectrum of views regarding the underlying issue of whether Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were fairly treated and whether they should be restored to their highest rank held.

For the sake of those in the audience who have not followed this debate closely, I will attempt to encapsulate a broad spectrum of thought on this very emotional and controversial issue. And I will try to do this by describing four points along this spectrum, recognizing that these four points do not include all the views on this subject and probably don't even include all the views of the people in this room today.

At the one end of the spectrum, we have the official U.S. Government position, espoused by many in this room, that Kimmel was in command, failed to do all that he could do to ensure protection of his forces to be ready for the attack, and thus, must be held accountable in the Navy tradition that the Captain is finally, ultimately and totally accountable for the disposition of his ship. This school of thought states, while others perhaps also failed in not providing the support Kimmel was expecting, this would not mitigate Kimmel's being ultimately responsible and no new facts have come to light to

justify restoration of four stars. What have I described is fundamentally the position of the Dorn Report of 1995, the last official U.S. Government review of the issue.

A second school of thought recognizes the Navy tradition of ultimate and complete responsibility, but holds that Washington, D.C. was singularly at fault in failing to provide intelligence, in exercising its responsibility to inform and support the Pacific Fleet Commander. And that the ultimate blame lies there, in Washington, D.C. Had the required intelligence support (and, I might add not just intelligence support but force structure support) been provided to Kimmel as promised to him, he would have taken different actions and probably would not have been surprised.

The third school of thought follows the same lines, but elaborates further pointing out peculiarities and irregularities in many of the inquiries surrounding Pearl Harbor. A lot of these inquiries were not mentioned before. Charging that these proceedings were fundamentally unfair, all the facts were not consistently available, in most cases Kimmel and General Short were not allowed to defend themselves, witnesses were intimidated by senior echelons in Washington, D.C., witnesses demonstrably perjured themselves, and documents were deliberately destroyed. All of this was in an effort to protect the Washington, D.C. establishment, shift blame to the Hawaii-based commanders, the scapegoats if you will.

The last point on the spectrum that I will describe, is what has been termed the conspiracy theory. It has been outlined in three major books, one of which has just been published recently. This thesis maintains that FDR's sole desire was to get us involved in the war in support of Great Britain, that he knew that the attack was coming, and that he knew the timing of the attack, and he knew it was to be at Pearl Harbor. He deliberately withheld this information, having decided in advance to sacrifice the eight old battleships of the Pacific Fleet, in the interest of inciting public opinion enough to support the political decision to declare war. This school of thought, of course, would also totally absolve Kimmel and Short since they were deliberately misled and set up by Washington, D.C.

Now there are many other points along the spectrum I tended to represent, some of which you will hear this morning, since we have chosen our four primary speakers so as to have two who are in favor of the restitution of Kimmel and Short to their highest ranks, and two who are opposed.

Now before I turn the podium over to our primary speakers, there are two short background presentations, which I think the audience will find useful.

The first of these will be presented by Professor Randy Popadopoulos. Professor Popadopoulos is Assistant Professor of History at George Washington University and a history lecturer at the University of Maryland. He received his undergraduate degree in American Military History from the University of Toronto. His M.A. in Military and Naval History from the University of Alabama, and his doctorate from George Washington University. Professor Popadopoulos will address the subject, Admiral

Kimmel in History and in Memory, Representations of Fair Play 1942-1999. Professor Randy Popadopoulos.

DR. SARANDIS POPADOPOULOS: [Discussion of historiography and media play]

Thank you Admiral Brooks. The attack on Pearl Harbor stems the moment that has remained indelibly etched into the collective memory of Americans for the past 58 years. Interest in the Japanese surprise attack has persisted amongst the vast majority of the population that had no direct contact with the events of 7 December 1941.

The permanent presence of Pearl Harbor in the collective American memory, also makes it a subject worthy for exploration by historians. Historians, however, find that their work seeking to establish the truth about what happened, runs afoul of widely held memories and opinions of the broader American public. No issue related to Pearl Harbor creates more of this type of controversy than the reliefs of Admiral Kimmel and General Short after the Japanese attack.

I would argue that the different sources, politicized sources, used by historians on one side and the broader public memory on the other, are in large part responsible for the persistent controversy surrounding Admiral Kimmel's relief entirely. To approach this question, I shall summarize historians' understanding of the relief of Admiral Kimmel as shown in the historical literature of Pearl Harbor.

To that end, I rely heavily on the works of historian Gordon Prange, especially his posthumously published, *At Dawn We Slept*. I chose to take my cues from this author because historians generally support his research. Prange highlights the creation of the so-called Roberts Commission, which concluded that both the Admiral and General had committed a dereliction of duty for failing to consult with one another before the attack, and that their errors of judgement were effective causes for the success of the attack.

One should quickly note, however, that Prange argued that dereliction of duty was unduly harsh, far more just was the assessment that the failures by the two commanders were due to errors of judgement. And thus, I would characterize the historical view of Kimmel as presented in Prange, as one that judged the Admiral as responsible for mistakes that increased the losses suffered by the U.S. Navy forces at Pearl Harbor.

How then has the press reported the role of Admiral Kimmel in regard to Pearl Harbor? Several generalizations can be made, starting with the most recent government report on Admiral Kimmel's fate, the 1995 Dorn Report, that Admiral Brooks mentioned.

The Dorn Report breaks down the responses to the Pearl Harbor in three periods. These periods were: first, the early years of World War II; second, the later half of World War II; and third, the post-war period.

Public response to the first period sought identification of those responsible for the disaster and its attention inevitably focused on the officials in command, Admiral Kimmel in this case.

During the second phase, the late war investigations, the public and the press partly shifted responsibility from Admiral Kimmel and General Short to Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations at the time, General George C. Marshall, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency, suggesting responsibility lay with the President.

Finally, the Dorn Report argues that in the post-war period academic scholarship has begun to arrive at a sober nuanced and balanced analysis of accountability as a result of the attack.

These generalizations all stand as far as they go, but we need some specific examples. Most importantly, and I think illustratively for our purposes today, these examples do not conform to historians' ideas of what happened at Pearl Harbor.

The magazine, *Newsweek*, reported on 2 February 1942, that the Pearl Harbor disaster was a product of inter-service rivalry. Suggesting that Admiral Kimmel's relations with General Short were marked by bickering and non-cooperation. Citing the Roberts Commission Report, the *Newsweek* argued that the absence of a conference between the two service commanders before the attack, worsened the impact of the Japanese strike. The *Honolulu Star Bulletin* was even less charitable to Admiral Kimmel, comparing him to a sentry that had been, "found asleep at his post."

Later in 1944, *Newsweek* again published a piece on Admiral Kimmel, this time regarding his possible court martial. More importantly though, the 1944 *Newsweek* piece also suggested airing, "incompetency of Pearl Harbor, in a court martial might damage American morale so much that the allied war effort might be hindered."

I would argue that as long as World War II was underway, the American media was inclined to remember Admiral Kimmel in a way that was harsher than historians who would subsequently write about his role.

I also argue the key transitional phase and the media's response to Admiral Kimmel came during the largest investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Joint Committee of Congress in 1945-1946.

The Joint Congressional Committee changed three essential components of the overall discussion of the Pearl Harbor attack, as well as the controversy surrounding Admiral Kimmel.

The first of these was the Admiral's decision to delay his general court martial in order to allow a chance for the committee to work on its findings.

Second, the Joint Congressional inquiry came after the end of World War II in an environment where criticism of the Roosevelt administration could occur without facing charges of undermining the war effort.

Related to this point, the key element that changed the shape of the media discussions and of the discussion of Pearl Harbor as a whole in my view was that this inquiry's members, were Representatives and Senators drawn from Congress were Democrats who were in the majority. Such a composition could only sharpen the division between those who believed Admiral Kimmel bore some responsibility for the attack and those who believed that he was being unfairly treated. In effect, the Joint Congressional inquiry politicized Admiral Kimmel's case.

Finally, the Congressional inquiry was the first one dealing with Admiral Kimmel that revealed to the public the breaking of Japanese codes by American cryptanalysts, suggesting that someone knew something of the attack beforehand and could have prevented the disaster. After this investigation, media reports muted their criticisms of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Anniversary pieces by columnist Jack Anderson, appeared in *Parade* Magazine in both December 1961 and 1966. The first Anderson article admittedly censured Admiral Kimmel and General Short for failing to meet, while the later one suggested the Admiral has been perhaps the victim of an unlucky break, a delay, or a subordinate not fully alert. In 1991, two para-contributors to the *Washington Post*, juxtaposed Admiral Kimmel's relief and retirement with awards and promotion bestowed upon General Douglas MacArthur. These news stories are some of the most common pieces regarding Admiral Kimmel's complaints presented in the press of 1945. We come then to those advocates of Admiral Kimmel who seek to have his rank of 7 December restored. Some of these are very main stream, including five Senators who in 1991 advocated just that.

But since 1945, the strongest journalistic support for Admiral Kimmel has come from the conservative McCormick Newspaper chain based in Chicago. On the other hand, the newspapers based in New York such as the *Times*, the former *Herald Tribune*, have criticized those who assigned responsibility for the results of the attack to the Roosevelt administration. In fact, after 1945, many of the attacks on the Roosevelt administration became increasingly strong, with many of those who supported Admiral Kimmel's case stating that he was a victim of the President's double dealing.

The Admiral's publication of his book in 1954, revealed some telling examples. One correspondent noted that these publications vindicated Admiral Kimmel and added, "to be George Cotlett Marshall or any of the other iniquitous survivors of plotted U.S. assassination, must today be the equivalent of being a deism of Hell. Judas looks no redder than they."

Another of these correspondents wrote that their feelings were so strong that they wrote to Admiral Kimmel and argued, "in all history has any tyrant done more to destroy his own people than Roosevelt and had a spineless and apathetic public ever been so slow to

awaken to the reason for the destruction that has followed. For Roosevelt's command of all lines of publicity has followed through not only the Truman regime, but the present administration as well. After all, who made Eisenhower?"

Admiral Kimmel could not take responsibility for these comments and he, in fact, rejected invitations to endorse an organization that held such views. But the memories of some Americans had been shaped into these sorts of attitudes by elements of the American press, not by the work of historians.

Now as I shall use the limited remainder of my time to raise a few questions that I hope will help frame today's debate. As a historian, I suggest that there are four elements of context worthy of consideration when thinking about Admiral Kimmel.

These four include a possible explanation for the continuing American interest in the Admiral's case, the relevance of tort law regarding negligence, the controversial role of intelligence in military operations, and the question of timing in Admiral Kimmel's request for reconsideration. I propose these four as potential questions for consideration for anyone thinking of Pearl Harbor.

From where in American culture did these motives for redress of the treatment of Admiral Kimmel come? Historian Richard Hofstadter writing at the same time Admiral Kimmel published his book, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, argued that Americans do not very quietly abide the evils of life. We are forever demanding changes, improvements, remedies, but not often with sufficient sense of the limits that the human condition will insistently impose upon us.

Second, in refusing to promote Admiral Kimmel after World War II, what role did definitions of negligence as generally defined in tort law play in government decisions? To most of us in the general public, the term negligence suggests an absence of carefulness. As a state of mind, either forgetfulness or inattentiveness. Non-lawyers, I'm one therefore, tend to equate negligence with moral fault, but legally the standard for negligence is different. Legally speaking, Admiral Kimmel could have been, I'm not saying he was, could have been guilty of neglect even if he was convinced that he was appropriately concerned about his forces safety.

Third, what was the complicated role of intelligence in the attack on Pearl Harbor? This point is related to the previous one. I think one point needs to be made. To answer intelligence questions, one needs to have the closest understanding of who knew what and when they knew it. It is not certain that the arrival of a warning even ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor would have been a much more successful American response. Finally, what were the limits on the U.S. Navy system of promotion in dealing with Admiral Kimmel as imposed by issues related to Pearl Harbor? Consider the time that the Admiral experienced the most favorable moment for his reinstatement after World War II, which I think was the time of publication of his memoirs in 1954. In fact, in the political timing, Admiral Kimmel's book was not good at all. For the U.S. Navy faced serious questions about its promotion system at that same time. Less than two years

earlier, the U.S. Navy's promotion policies had been under serious fire from Senator Henry M. Jackson and Representative Sydney R. Yates, resulting in stalled promotions of 40 captains to admirals rank. In that environment, promoting Admiral Kimmel would have fueled the controversy with larger ramifications than just Pearl Harbor. One which few on Capitol Hill or the White House wanted to fight. Even if there had been a strong desire within the administration to resolve the Admiral's case, there could have been no restoration of his rank at that time.

I hope that my remarks have given you a good introduction to how opinions regarding the relief of Admiral Kimmel have come into play over the past 58 years and look forward to hearing the discussion. Thank you very much.

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of David Hatch, Director of Center of Cryptologic History, National Security Agency]

Ladies and gentlemen you heard Randy make mention of the role of intelligence, or the absence of intelligence, in Admiral Kimmel's ability to execute his responsibilities. Indeed a key element in understanding the Kimmel controversy is the knowledge of the U.S. capability at the time of Pearl Harbor and shortly before Pearl Harbor, to break Japanese codes and thus uncover Japanese intentions. You will hear a number of cryptologic terms, intelligence terms, and cryptologic-related nicknames, in the course of the presentations today. And in order to make those a little bit easier to understand and perhaps less confusing, our next presenter prepared the handout sheet you have in your folders [See Appendix B]. I will ask him to briefly go over that and also to provide us perhaps about five minutes on U.S. cryptologic capabilities and, in particular, the issue of whether or not we were able to break and read Japanese naval communications in the Japanese naval general purpose code of December 1941, which has been known by the shorthand interpretation JN25B. Mr. David Hatch is with us today. He is a professional cryptologist who has been employed by the National Security Agency for in excess of twenty years, and his current position is Director of the Center for Cryptologic History at the National Security Agency.

MR. DAVID HATCH: [Cryptology overview]

Sounds like I'm supposed to make cryptologists out of everyone and give us a quick survey of twenty years of cryptologic history in a critical period. We will do that in ten minutes, so my advice is fasten your seatbelts.

The United States first got into communications intelligence on a national level in a professional way with World War I. At the end of World War I, we had a cryptologic capability that was the equal to any in the world. Then we disbanded it in the general demobilization after the war to end all wars. For the first time, we established a cryptologic capability at the national level. That was the famous Cypher Bureau run by Herbert Yardley, which ran through the 1920s. The famous stories told by Yardley are well known, I won't go over them. The key point to remember is that when this chamber was closed in 1930, its disgruntled chief, Herbert Yardley, wrote a tell-all memoir called,

The American Black Chamber, in which he talked about the solution to diplomatic cypher and code systems in the 1920s. This prompted a number of countries around the world to change their systems. Japan was one of them--highly embarrassed. Several of Yardley's funniest stories had to do with assaulting Japanese systems. And the foreign ministry in response began adopting new ways to encipher its communications.

In the mid-1930s, it had adopted its first cypher system. This was taken on by the U.S. Army, its cryptologists and cryptanalysts looked at it, and it was solved. But in 1939, the Japanese adopted a much-more sophisticated system for their diplomatic communications.

The Americans by the way, called the first system Red. It was popular to give color nicknames to various things to the military in those days.

The second system, the more sophisticated one was named, Purple. That's the more famous system. This was a cypher machine. That is, it encyphered messages, letter by letter. And in the case of this machine, it did so electro-mechanically by using open and closed telephone switches.

This system was solved by the Army, by statistical analysis, somewhat abetted by the Japanese foreign ministries bad habit of occasionally encyphering English language texts that it intended to present to the Secretary of State. In essence, we were cryptanalyzing English as well as Japanese. In order to distribute this material, the U.S. Army set up what may be the first compartmented intelligence system in the United States government. It was called the Magic System. Army's chief code breaker, William Friedman, liked to joke that his cryptanalysts were magicians. So this material was stamped Top Secret Magic.

The Army had some problems, however, it had solved the system but it couldn't exploit it properly. It didn't have proper collection systems, it didn't have enough Japanese linguists. This forced the Army somewhat unwillingly into cooperation with the Navy.

The Navy had established a cryptologic organization from the late 1920s. It was aimed primarily at Japan. The Navy, I'm sure, realized early that our interests were going to conflict in the Pacific and they were training cryptologists and linguists and had set up a collection system to prepare for cryptologic operations against Japan in case of war.

The Army and the Navy cooperated on a voluntary basis in exploiting the Japanese diplomatic communications from the Purple machine. The Magic information that was derived was exploited by the Army and the Navy, distributed alternately by the Army and the Navy. Remember, the machine was nicknamed Purple. It decyphered diplomatic communications. Intelligence derived from it was marked Magic.

At the same time, the Navy was looking at Japanese naval systems and it was attempting to exploit a number of them. Throughout the 1930s, it exploited a number of Japanese systems that were used in maneuvers and war games. In 1939, indeed throughout the late

1930s, the Japanese began improving their naval cryptologic systems. They adopted a number of sophisticated code systems to protect their military, that is their naval communications. These were code systems based on code books. Just as the name implies, code book is a book that lists virtually everything you might want to say in a military situation. Usually providing several alternative ways of saying it. In order to protect it, each entry, whether it's a letter, a syllable, a whole word or phrase, has a substitution. A five-letter or a five-digit entity that would be used instead of the real word that you wanted to send in order to protect that, since given enough messages particularly in a military situation, people could solve it.

People have been solving that kind of system since the middle ages. So to protect that, this five-digit or five-letter group, was further scrambled by use of an additive table. This was simply a list of randomly generated numbers that would be added to the five-letter or five-digit group in the code book. This is what would be sent.

So the task of the naval cryptologist or cryptanalyst, was rather straight forward. They had to strip off this random number from the transmission, then arriving at the original code book value underneath, they just had to figure out what the real language equivalent was of that five-letter or five-digit group. It was worth it.

The Japanese were good, but the American naval cryptanalysts were also very good. They solved a number of minor systems, but in the late 1930s and around 1940, they had a choice of systems to work on. There were about four high-grade systems that were used for command and control and general purpose communications, including the famous JN25. There were also a number of lesser systems used for technical communications, for attaches and consular officials. Some of these were actually being exploited. Plus in 1941, United States and Great Britain began cooperating in breaking of enemy codes, or potential enemy codes, and the Navy began cooperating with the British in working against German naval communications.

Remember, we were facing enemies on both coasts. So the limited cryptologic resources were disbursed among German and Japanese systems and within the Japanese systems they were attacking a number of high-grade systems at the same time, as well as a large array of lower-grade systems.

The resources were not there to make progress on all areas. Today we look back at JN25, I think, with a little bit of nostalgia. We remember the large quantities of information that it provided and the high quality of information it provided in World War II. But we have to remember that in 1940, as they were allocating resources to work these systems, it was just one of several competing important systems. It was not clear which one was going to be the most vulnerable or which was going to yield to American cryptanalysts first.

So, it's not surprising that in 1940 and 1941, American Navy cryptanalysts had not made much progress against JN25. Largely they had recovered a number of systems. Perhaps some of the dating systems from it. Perhaps 10% was readable in 1940-1941.

Let me make two other points about this process. It was a long process. We justly remember the brilliance and the persistence of the cryptanalysts who solved the system. But they were only one part of it. The messages had to be collected, they had to be sent back or forwarded to the central processing area, and then they had to be cryptanalyzed and then they had to be translated, and then they had to be analyzed for the information, and the information turned around to a commander. It was a very long, complicated process.

Then what did you get? The answer to all your questions? No, you got what the potential enemy was saying to himself. Which sometimes answered your questions and sometimes not. You could not guarantee what was underlying the code system. You tried to work the most powerful, the one that looked like it was going to provide the answers to your questions, but you had no surety that once you had done all this complicated and brilliant work, you were going to get what you really needed.

Now after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American Navy put larger resources against the systems, they solved JN25, they came up with an efficient systems for processing this information, and it provided excellent support to our commanders in combat operations. But that's a story for another day. I thank you.

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of VADM Richardson]

He had a distinguished war record, flying off *Hornet*, *Wasp*, and *Saratoga*, and also out of Henderson Field in Guadalcanal, I believe he flew out off Guadalcanal itself. Shooting down four Japanese aircraft and being shot down once in combat himself. He subsequently commanded squadrons, ships, air wings, and was selected to flag rank. As a flag officer, he commanded the carrier forces off Vietnam. He subsequently was the commander of our Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and was Deputy Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Since retirement, Admiral Richardson has served as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to various Navy commands to include the Office of Naval Intelligence when I was its director. And Admiral Richardson is known to this day as one of the Navy's premier thinkers on the subject of command, control, and intelligence support of operational commanders. Vice Admiral David Richardson.

VADM DAVID RICHARDSON: [Proponent for posthumous promotion of Rear Admiral Kimmel]

Thank you, Tom. Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. I must first comment on Admiral Brooks' remarks regarding perjuries during war. The truth sometimes carries a very high price tag and needless loss in lives. Now my major point is that historical accuracy and professional accountability require a complete record of what occurred. We've never had that. We still must search for truth in the origins of that brave, national tragedy. The objective is to identify all the errors that were committed and the circumstances so that we not repeat them in the future with needless losses in lives. I think we all know that in the recent Dorn Report, an administration admits for the very

first time that Kimmel and Short were not solely at fault. Others were also to blame. But who, and for what? And with what consequences?

A full accounting requires that those others also be identified together with the errors they committed, the Dorn Report moved substantially in that direction by its admission. Bear in mind as we cite details, that there are two possible explanations for the actions and failures by our leaders in Washington. Either serious errors were committed in Washington, or the actions and omissions were deliberate, specifically designed to get us into the war.

The disaster at Pearl Harbor had three causes. The adoption by Washington of a military strategy that placed the defense of Britain and defeat of Hitler in highest priority. A sound, national strategy, but it weakened Kimmel's forces substantially. In furtherance of that strategy, Washington reduced Kimmel's forces while increasing economic pressure on Japan that culminated in the issuance of an ultimatum on November the 26th. This policy was challenged by General Marshall and Admiral Stark five weeks before the attack. They wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull advising to ease up in our negotiations because our forces were inferior to those available to Japan.

Secondly, denial to Admiral Kimmel and General Short of essential intelligence information available in Washington, that would have enabled them to limit somewhat the extent of damages received.

And finally, Japan's excellence at planning and skill in execution of their surprise attack.

Two of these causes were rooted in Washington, one in Japan, none in Hawaii. We do know from written accounts by insiders that Roosevelt first sought unsuccessfully a German declaration of war against this and then one from Japan. As to Japan, Stimson himself said, "the question was how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves. This was a difficult proposition."

In his diary entry of November the 25th, Stimson outlines to Roosevelt his strategy for maneuvering the Japanese into striking the first blow. Secretary of State Hull's ultimatum was issued the day following. No one advised Kimmel or Short of this line of thought, nor of Cordell Hull's ultimatum.

In appraising Kimmel and Short's performance, we must understand why surprise attacks, especially during a transition to war, are so effective. They succeed because they are meticulously planned. The aggressor deals himself a straight flush. He holds full knowledge of his target's composition, strengths, weaknesses, patterns of operation, and of the geographic characteristics that impact on that. All options are his, including time, place, and circumstances of the attack itself. And here a fact, detrimental to the reasoning of those critical of Admiral Kimmel and General Short is that Japan achieved the benefits of surprise about mid-morning, December the 6th, the day before the attack--twenty-plus hours before that attack. From that time on, control of events was in Japanese hands.

This was the case because the Japanese force was much stronger, much faster, and its combat reach much longer than Kimmel's. Washington's sole remaining operational option was to provide the Hawaiian commanders intelligence from decodes already available and those decoded during the afternoon and evening of December the 6th, Washington time. In this light, Washington's seemingly irrational behavior, those last few hours before the attack, becomes understandable.

Hawaiian vulnerability to surprise air and submarine attacks was well known. When Admiral Kimmel's predecessor insisted that the Fleet be returned to the West Coast, the President ordered him replaced by Admiral Kimmel. Kimmel's major combat units were four aircraft carriers and twelve battleships. Three months later, the President transferred the carrier *Yorktown*, with me aboard, and three battleships to the Atlantic.

That transfer gave Japan a better than two-to-one military advantage. And it eased their concerns that a surprise attack was too risky. Later developments increased that advantage to better than three-to-one.

As I stated, both General Marshall and Admiral Stark in early November, urged Hull to ease up in the negotiations because of our relative weakness. Japanese Ambassador Nomura met secretly with Admiral Stark in the CNO's quarters to urge easing or he feared war would result. All thought of easing, however, stopped suddenly. The critical date was November the 26th. The President ordered Hull to take a hard-line approach with Japan.

The following day, November the 27th, Washington sent messages called War Warnings to Kimmel. The War Warnings were similar to five previous War Warnings received by Kimmel during the preceding period, 3 February – 24 November. None of which identified Pearl Harbor as the likely target. That same day, November the 27th, Washington ordered fifty Army pursuit planes, which was half of Short's inventory, sent to Wake and Midway. Thereby indicating Washington's belief that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked. For practical reasons, Kimmel substituted Marine fighters.

The next day, November the 28th, Admiral Halsey departed Pearl with carrier *Enterprise* Task Force with the Marine fighters aboard for Wake Island. Admiral Newton with the carrier *Lexington* Task Force, departed Pearl Harbor December the 5th, for Midway with fighter reinforcement, also on orders from Washington.

Admiral Wilson Brown with an amphibious force departed Pearl for Johnson Island that same date. All task forces were on wartime footage. Their commanders having been shown the War Warning message by Admiral Kimmel and given authorization to fight. Destroyers were off the harbor entrance with orders to sink any detected submarines. Kimmel's only four oilers capable of underway replenishment were committed to replenishing those task forces.

On the morning of December the 7th, Admiral Kimmel's major combat units in Pearl Harbor consisted of seven battleships. The eighth was in dry dock, the ninth in overhaul

in Bremerton. His third aircraft carrier, the *Saratoga*, was under repair on the West Coast. The other two, as noted, were on detached duty ordered by Washington.

The Japanese used six aircraft carriers in their attack augmented by about twenty-eight submarines off the harbor entrance and around Oahu. Their carriers at top speeds exceeded thirty knots--their weapons range three hundred miles. Kimmel's battleships speeds were seventeen knots--weapons range fifteen miles. Kimmel was literally incapable of harming the Japanese force. Even had his two carriers been suitably placed, given Japan's submarine presence, the odds against him still exceeded three-to-one.

The Japanese had conducted in their knowledge that Kimmel might attempt a sortie, an action they would learn about even if it was occurring, and against that contingency Japan deployed a large submarine force that covered the exit from Pearl Harbor. If he sortied during the hours prior to the attack, as noted by his successor, Admiral Nimitz, his ships could have been sunk by air and submarines in deep ocean.

Admiral Kimmel's only rational operational option during the final eighteen hours before the attack was to remain in harbor and set general quarters at daylight, December the 7th. He needed the intelligence Washington had, and he had every right to expect it, to implement that last measure. There was no other option available to him that made any sense.

General Short had two options. They were to implement a fly-away of non-fighter type aircraft at day break and to have some fighters airborne, others ready to launch. With the fore-mentioned Japanese advantages in mind, Admiral Tom Moorer remarked, "if Nelson and Napoleon had been in charge in Pearl, the results would have been the same."

Were Kimmel and Short inattentive? Were they caught napping? Did they ignore their War Warning? Why weren't Kimmel's patrol planes flying search missions? The answers are found in two propositions. The context and content of the War Warning messages, and in Washington's failure to provide critically and important tactical intelligence that would have prompted Kimmel, to set general quarters at daybreak, and General Short to conduct a fly-away of non-combat type aircraft plus getting his interception ready.

The two messages entitled War Warnings were directives. They imposed specific tasks. Navy's War Warning of November the 27th to Admiral Kimmel, advised that an aggressive move by Japan within the next few days was expected. It specifically mentioned the likelihood that Japan would initiate action against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. It directed Kimmel to take a defensive posture from which to implement warplan WPL-46.

In compliance with WPL-46 tasking, Kimmel initiated preparations to regroup his carrier and amphibious forces to depart Pearl with his battleships the day following war's outbreak and assault the selected designated locations in the Marshall Islands. His patrol planes would perform surveillance and added submarine protection to support his task

forces. Given the information he then held, that these were found proper responses to the War Warnings and so stated by the Navy Board of Inquiry.

General Marshall's warning to General Short of November the 27th, directed that he take defensive measures, but those measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm civilian population or disclose intent. To not alarm, to not disclose intent, in a message warning of war!

There were just under 200,000 Japanese in Hawaii. With that was what Washington had in mind? His message also states United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. General Short interpreted this guidance as a requirement to implement protection from sabotage--an action that disabled his fighter aircraft. And as directed, he reported the actions he was taking to Washington. And General Marshall took no exception to it and so admitted. Either Washington did not think an attack against Pearl Harbor would occur, or as Stimson implied in his diary, did not want the attack aborted. Either one fits.

These warnings, considered in the context of other essentially simultaneous demands, indicated to the Hawaiian commanders that Washington thought a Japanese initiative would take place away from Hawaii and expected Kimmel to prepare for that.

Now to Washington's error in failing to provide tactical intelligence. Operational experts view tactical intelligence essential to sound military decision. One must understand the command need for a continuous acquisition of information from every source for the creation of a font of knowledge that enhances the command's ability to function effectively. Within that information flow, there is a category of time-sensitive information that's operationally significant that is pertinent to one's own situation and status. And that provokes change in one's on-going activity at that time.

That information was available in Washington. Admiral Kimmel had specifically requested it. I recommend you read Admiral Kimmel's letter to Admiral Stark in a hand-out that I provided, that's available outside. It's entitled, "The Pearl Harbor Disaster: Washington's Intelligence Support Failure." [Appendix C]

I recently received a letter from General Andrew Goodpastor who is seated in the audience, and I had the pleasure of working for him when he was SACEUR and I had Sixth Fleet. The General stated, "You speak of the aggressive choosing of time, place, and circumstances of the attack. This caught my eye, because it is exactly the point I repeatedly made to NATO and U.S. authority when I served as SACEUR. I emphasize that because they, the Russians, could have the initiative, the Soviets could choose the time, and place and mode of attack. Powerful advantages which meant that I should be furnished and be free to act upon the best possible intelligence to provide warning. That is exactly what was not provided to Admiral Kimmel and General Short."

Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the Service Secretaries were competent, assiduous, responsible-minded individuals. Common sense and the actions of the Army and Navy staffs suggest that their belief that Hawaii would

not be attacked changed radically during the first week of December. Decoded message traffic increasingly indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor would take place about 7:30, the morning of December the 7th, Hawaiian time.

And this was fully understood by both Army and Navy staffs. But neither Army nor Navy provided either Kimmel or Short any of the late-breaking intelligence information that so indicated. When the President read the first thirteen parts of the fourteen-part Japanese instruction to Ambassador Namura around 7:30 p.m., December the 6th, he commented, "this means war." And shortly thereafter to his dinner guests he stated, "we will be at war tomorrow." The fourteenth part with instructions specifying delivery to our Secretary of State that 1:00 p.m. Sunday, and those of you here who are acquainted with State Department, realize that getting a Secretary out at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday, is significant. And that was 7:30 Hawaiian time. And that message was distributed around midnight. There is evidence that Roosevelt discussed with his advisors late that night about what should be done. We know that Secretary Knox thought that an alert was sent to Kimmel. He inquired of Kimmel and arrived at Pearl Harbor several days after the attack. Did you receive my alert message of Saturday night and no such message was actually sent. When the CNO, Admiral Stark, was briefed about 10:30 a.m. Washington time, his briefer pleaded with him to pick up the phone and call Kimmel. He picked it up and then slowly put it back down and said, I will call the President instead. He did that.

The operator said the President couldn't talk with him just then. Now, in that context, what would Admiral Stark have asked the President? "Mr. President, I want your permission to call Hawaii. Is there any other candidate in that context? When he finally arrived in his office after a horseback ride General Marshall's staff pleaded with him to notify General Short. Their frustration at their inability to get him to act is also provided in one of my handouts. Several prominent researchers and authors believe there was a late night FDR meeting and this explains why both Stark and Marshall could not remember where they were that night. Their decision was to not inform the commanders in Hawaii for fear that if Kimmel sortied; his ships would be sunk in deep ocean waters. The disaster would have been far greater. That makes sense.

Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, Spruance, and Stanley all professionally tied to Admiral Kimmel supported him strongly. Admiral Ernest J. King recanted his wartime condemnation in 1948 stating that the wartime realities no longer obtained. Two former Chairmen of the JCS, Admiral Moorer and Admiral Crowe, three former Chiefs of Naval Operations, together with 29 four-star admirals, General Goodpaster and General William McCaffrey, who I understand is the father of the drug czar, have signed letters of support for both Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Admiral Spruance expressed it best. In a letter replied to Navy Historian Samuel Elliot Morison, Spruance stated, and I quote, "I have always felt that Kimmel and Short were held responsible for Pearl Harbor in order that the American people might have no reason to lose confidence in their government in Washington. This was probably justifiable under the circumstances at that time, but it does not justify forever damming these two fine officers. The point you raise about General MacArthur is well taken. But the Army would have lost a very able man if

MacArthur had been dealt with as Kimmel and Short were. Thank you, and thank you very much for being here.

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of Dr. Love]

Thank you very much Admiral. And my apologies for putting you on *Hornet* when you were on *Yorktown*. Our next speaker will be Professor Robert Love from the History Department at the U.S. Naval Academy. Professor Love did his Undergraduate work at the University of Washington and received his Doctorate in Modern History from the University of California at Davis. He has taught recent Military and Naval History at the U.S. Naval Academy since 1975. Professor Love has published six books including a two-volume history of the U.S. Navy, and most recently an edited collection of essays entitled "Pearl Harbor Revisited". He has just finished writing a new diplomatic and military history, "Cold War and New World Order - America and the Powers Since 1943" which will be published next year. Professor Love.

DR. ROBERT LOVE: [Proponent for the status quo] *Dr. Love requested that the Foundation summarize rather than provide a verbatim transcription. His presentation was welcome as his thoughts reflected attitudes prevalent in the academic naval historical community. For Love and his peers, the question of Kimmel's responsibility has long been settled in the scholarly publications that have examined the Pearl Harbor attack and they reject attempts to exonerate Kimmel. Dr. Love who was on sabbatical at the Naval Academy prepared and delivered a robust presentation. Dr. David F. Winkler of the Foundation summarizes Dr. Love's remarks as follows:*

Dr. Love opened by reminding the attendees that during the first week of December 1941 the Soviets blocked the Nazi advance on Moscow at the Battle of Tula which had significant long-term consequences. He then focused on Pearl Harbor, first noting that a state of war actually commenced around 0645 when scout floatplanes from the Japanese cruisers arrived overhead and then "The Battle of Pearl Harbor" erupted when the Japanese carrier planes arrived: a battle that the Japanese won.

Dr. Love stated there were three outcomes from the battle. First was an escalation to a true world war leading to the world country alignment situation of the present day. Second, the battle immediately knocked back the nation's penchant for isolationism. Love cited the challenges faced by the Roosevelt administration to approve Lend Lease and increase readiness. Finally, Love commented the influence of the battle on how the rest of the war would be fought...and he argued this influence was nil.

Whereas others have pressed the supposition that Pearl Harbor represented a turning point in naval warfare, Love noted that American naval leaders had long understood the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air attack and the ongoing war in Europe provided case studies to confirm the concern. Thus the battle really had little military significance and Kimmel's fate was to be expected. Love gave numerous examples of how other military leaders of Russia, England, and Germany lost battles that year and, in some cases, paid with their lives as well as losing their jobs.

As for Kimmel, Love reminded the audience that he had been appointed to complete Vice Admiral Richardson's tour and noted that there were intentions to replace him if war broke out. He then cited comments from contemporaries about Kimmel that were not flattering. Love noted a 1960 attempt by the president of the Naval Academy Alumni Association to have Kimmel promoted was bitterly opposed by many of the chapters.

Love quoted former CNO William H. Standley who admired the fleet's high state of efficiency but lamented the fleet was unready for attack. USS *Pennsylvania* proved an exception, and Love told how the drydocked battleship commanded by Savvy Cooke broke rules to have unlocked ammo boxes topside.

In answering his own rhetorical question, "Why was Kimmel unready?" Love looked at the Admiral's mindset that reflected a Washington viewpoint that Japan would be reckless to lash out at Britain and the United States when it had failed to defeat China.

Love discussed how other commanders in the Philippines, Alaska, Panama, and even the Caribbean reacted more aggressively to the war warning messages. He then cited Admiral King who said Kimmel had a great defense plan but just didn't implement it.

Love then attacked the conspiracy theorists by stating the President Roosevelt had no political incentives in allowing a Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor. Indeed the defeat nearly cost the Democrats the House in the following year. Love noted had the Americans won the battle of Pearl Harbor, we still would have been at war, only Kimmel would have kept his command.

Love remarked how Kimmel became a bitter man, claiming Admiral Stark betrayed him. In Love's view, Kimmel's bitterness was attributed to an inner knowledge that Pearl Harbor was the "chance he had missed."

Love concluded by downplaying the Kimmel controversy as having long being settled in the historiography of the event. To Love, the real significance of Pearl Harbor stems from the larger forces released due to America's entry in the war that are still with us today.

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of Captain Beach]

Thank you Dr. Love for your presentation. Captain Ned Beach, a veteran submariner and well-known author has several books to his credit, including *Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor*. Today he is here to present a paper he has titled "Historical Fairness and National Honor."

CAPT EDWARD L. BEACH, USN (RET.): [Proponent for exoneration]

Justice delayed is justice denied, the saying goes, but even delayed justice is better than none at all. So far, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short have had neither. It's time to change that.

From the circumstances of the attack on Pearl Harbor, one has to conclude that its remarkable success owes far more to thorough planning and execution by the forces of Japan than to US negligence. The disaster to our fleet and 3681 casualties excepted, the long-term result was favorable to the Western Allies. An aroused America became a fearful enemy, a point the world noted well. Pearl Harbor brought us wholeheartedly into WWII, and thus led directly to the defeat of Hitler, who, after occupying the entire European continent, would in due course have attacked the United States. It led also to the end of barbaric Japanese expansion in the Far East.

Looked at in this way, Pearl Harbor was a strategic disaster for the Axis. It is well known that Winston Churchill thought so, for he virtually said as much. We honor him for the single-minded way in which he sought our entry into World War II. This saved his country from defeat by Nazi Germany, and rescued Western Europe. By the common definition of the term WWII was a "good war." It eliminated two of the most disgraceful regimes in human history.

Great events have their own proportions, but their historic rationale is seldom clear to contemporary minds. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor is rightly looked on as one of the most extraordinary occurrences of human history, unmatched by anything before or since. To suggest that any such event could have been cost-free is not logical, and carping over the relative values of any particular set of lives lost is unseemly, measured against the incalculable cost in life that was the legacy of World War II as a whole. Was FDR *wrong* to have maneuvered the United States into a war to save Europe from Hitler? Granted our American ethic that a single life lost needlessly is one too many, how do the 2400 who were killed at Pearl Harbor square against the nearly four times as many that we gave willingly at Normandy, or against the thousands that were taken by the Nazis and Japanese, every day, all around the world? Or, were our isolationists right after all? Should nations other than ours have borne the entire burden? Franklin Roosevelt's water hose metaphor when a neighbor's house is burning comes to mind.

"What's the difference anymore?" one may ask. "It's all over." But this ignores the question of justice, upon which two important types of honor: personal honor, and the honor of nations, are built. Justice must be based on facts, not on pre-conceived ideas of what history "ought to be." With the tremendous effect Pearl Harbor has had on our country and world history, it is now totally clear that for a number of obvious reasons, in addition to some subtle ones, the history of what actually happened has been overlaid by the wishes of those in charge. Reasons include the needs of the moment, the ever-enlarging capabilities of the communication media, ordinary human emotion, and the inherent desire of all those on the world stage to write history as they would like it to be. In short, to a far greater extent than anyone is willing to admit, the need for "political correctness" at this time of all times is what controls what is written as the true and accurate account of events. Historians the world over will agree with this.

They are also familiar with old ideas of the importance of both honor and justice. Viewed pragmatically, notions about such abstract concepts have been in the forefront of history from the beginning. Today's attitudes may sometimes seem to challenge this ideal, but notwithstanding, personal honor is still our country's ethic: an honorable person will not lie, cheat, or steal, or behave dishonorably in any way. We have held this ideal for a long time, and have applied it to nations as well as to individuals.

It is now clear that the facts we already know about Pearl Harbor point directly to a terrible injustice done to the commanders at that outpost. They were held accountable without trial of any kind, without the opportunity publicly to defend themselves. We can all recall the final words of our revered Declaration of Independence: "...with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor." It's part of the creed that created America—and yet, in the case of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, our national ethic has been disregarded.

Anyone conversant with our 1941 capabilities in air and sea power in the Pacific would have to concede that, given the conditions, the disaster at Pearl Harbor could not have been avoided. Admiral Kimmel's predecessor had been fired for bringing that fact up too imperatively to the President. Kimmel himself, very much aware of the difficulty, addressed the Chief of Naval Operations, strongly outlining his deficiencies in nearly all the items that make a fleet self-sufficient. He had not enough patrol planes to maintain any sort of early warning air surveillance (he had barely enough, under strict control, to carry out the scouting portion of WPL-46, for whose implementation he was responsible at the outbreak of war). His anti-aircraft weaponry was laughably antiquated and had, in fact, been so characterized by our British contemporaries, then engaged in the fight of their lives. His replenishment capability at sea was insufficient for the war plan with which he had been tasked. All our latest war-production materials were being sent to England as a matter of national policy, but Kimmel (and Short) deserved better service than they were getting. They were being more sinned against than they had any idea. Material supplies were only part of their problem.

For reasons unclear to this day, Pearl Harbor had been cut out of the Intelligence loop. Not only were the commanders there not receiving critically important information directly pertaining to their responsibilities, they were not getting any of the "Magic" interceptions that the other commanders of equivalent rank were receiving, and what was much worse, there was no way they could even have discovered they were out of the pattern. Kimmel wrote of his concern, specifically about Intelligence, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and had made a trip to Washington to deliver the letter to him by hand. He received, in return, categorical assurance of utmost support in Intelligence, and all other areas as well, but in fact he was denied any support whatever, and was not even allowed to discover how badly he was being served. When all of Washington was jumping with tension over the rapidly worsening relations with Japan, the two Pearl Harbor commanders received, only once, a ten-day-old sabotage warning in a pair of "War Warning" messages that are to this day models of obfuscatory language.

For that matter, not one of these “War Warning” messages was as explicit as the message sent on 17 June, 1940, from the War Department to the Hawaiian garrison (this is what an alert should sound like):

IMMEDIATELY ALERT COMPLETE DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE TRANS-PACIFIC RAID, TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHOUT CREATING PUBLIC HYSTERIA OR PROVOKING UNDUE CURIOSITY OF NEWSPAPERS OR ALIEN AGENTS. SUGGEST MANEUVER BASE. MAINTAIN ALERT UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECRET COMMUNICATION DIRECT WITH CHIEF OF STAFF WILL BE FURNISHED YOU SHORTLY. ACKNOWLEDGE.

There were five “war warning” messages received between 3 February through 24 November of that year. None was as explicitly worded as the example cited (done partly to show that Washington could compose a succinct message when it wanted to)

The period in port is by design one of relaxation from being at sea. All ships, and all crews, must “have a run on shore” from time to time. During war, or in emergency, such rules are changed when they need to be, with reasons therefor made clear to those affected whenever possible. Only days before the attack, when the two carriers based at Pearl were sent away on as-yet unexplained wild-goose chases, Kimmel directed they go on complete wartime alert. He did this with full consideration of the circumstances under which he was operating, including the vaguely worded “war warnings” received ten days earlier. The ships remaining in port were not so placed; and there was no reason so to do. Some in fact, had to reduce their readiness for combat, for example, the *Nevada*.

That ship was having her 120-knot anti-aircraft director cams upgraded with 180-knot cams. It had been directed that this alteration be accomplished as soon as possible. The new cams were still not fast enough against 250-knot airplanes, but they were better than the old ones. Her starboard AA director had been changed; the port one was scheduled for the alteration on the following Monday. She had just replaced her 14-inch shells with newer, more modern ones, and had stored newly formulated propellant ammunition for the new shells in her magazines. *Arizona*, berthed just ahead, was scheduled to begin receiving the new ammunition on Monday. In preparation, she had opened her forward magazines. Some ships, *Oklahoma* and *California* among them, had their double-bottoms open for Monday morning inspection as to their condition of preservation. Since these things had to be done, they were done at the most logical time, when the ships were in harbor between stints at sea.

Had anyone in authority at Pearl Harbor had the slightest inkling of the emergency soon to be upon the ships of our battle line, obviously this would not have been allowed. In hindsight, today we ask rhetorically, “Why were they not aware?” but the answer, clear to those who will look at it, nonetheless eludes our understanding because, while it is a national habit to accept almost uncritically allegations of waste, or inefficiency, in high places, we seem almost constitutionally unable to accept dereliction at our seat of government.

Lately, however, the Dorn Report has made an official governmental admission that important mistakes were made here in Washington; and it is the contention of those favoring exoneration that these mistakes were overwhelmingly determinant in causing the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

It was fortuitous that Washington ordered our two most important ships away from Pearl Harbor, just in time. These were *Enterprise* and *Lexington*, the only carriers Kimmel had at his disposal. His third, the *Saratoga*, was finishing training in San Diego following overhaul. As noted, the two big ships had been sent out on a full war footing. Kimmel had in fact showed their commanders the War Warning messages. But neither Kimmel nor Short had received even the slightest hint of a threat against Pearl Harbor itself, and no one knew that Yamamoto, whose own information sources had briefed him on the locations of our carriers, had committed twice as many of his best ones to the task of destroying our Fleet, our two carriers being prominently specified as special targets. Pearl Harbor was the home base of the Pacific Fleet, in the then-distant Hawaii. The warning signs had been well identified in Washington; but none of this vitally necessary intelligence had been passed to the men in command there in Hawaii.

The removal of these two vitally important aircraft carriers from danger was the only good thing that happened to Pearl Harbor in the time frame of our concern. The long-range benefits came later. Our forces in Hawaii had neither enough guns, nor the necessary ammunition, to defend against enemy aircraft, nor enough long-range patrol planes to detect them coming in. This, despite Kimmel's almost prayerful plea to improve this particularly important force.

Japan, it must always be remembered, attacked our fleet in a time of peace, not of war. It was a peacetime international crime of the first order, deliberately planned to take place early on a Sunday morning. We declared war on Japan the next day, making it retroactive to the day before so that our men, at least, could not be accused of having fired at the nationals of another nation during time of peace. Japan declared war a day or so later, but no one paid any attention to that folderol. The attack was declaration enough, and we vowed Japan would rue the day she thought of it!

In retrospect, a surprise attack was the most foolish thing Japan could have done. It brought about the fury of a thoroughly awakened American public, and led directly to the use of the nuclear weapon on two of her principal cities. Had Japan declared war when her forces crossed the international date line, about 1 December, then attacked a few days later, she would probably have lost a few more aircraft to our anti-aircraft fire, but not many, for we would have had no more guns, or combat aircraft, than before. She would have been able to argue, however, that she had behaved properly when confronted with an ultimatum she could not accept. Our hatred for her might not have been as great.

The only other difference in results would have been probably in *Oklahoma*. This ship, her inner compartments sealed instead of open for inspection, might nonetheless have been sunk by Japan's extraordinarily well designed torpedoes, but she would probably

not have capsized. Powered by reciprocating engines, she could most likely have been restored to operation more quickly than the other seriously damaged battle-wagons.

As it was, about 400 men were entombed and lost in *Oklahoma*, and more than 1100 in *Arizona* when her forward magazines blew up. Had these two unfortunate ships been a little luckier, or if Japan had observed international law when resorting to arms, the cost of Pearl Harbor might well have been less than 1000 servicemen, instead of the 2403 victims we counted, and we might not have taken on the visceral hatred for Japan that culminated in the atomic bombs on two of her major cities.

Stark, the highest ranking officer in the Navy, abysmally failed in his duty. Not only did he fail to deliver on the materiel level (the 100 patrol planes that were never sent), he also directly misled his subordinate by falsely assuring him that he was receiving all pertinent information when, in fact, he had been totally cut out of the loop. But even if Kimmel had detected approach of the Japanese task force, even had all his ships been at battle stations at the moment of attack (his only option that awful morning), there was no way he could have prevented the ordained result. In spite of two years watching the war unfold in Europe, our Congress, and our naval officials in Washington, had permitted our fleet in the Pacific to remain still woefully deficient in air defense. Caught by surprise or not, one cannot effectively employ weapons one does not have.

Most important, Washington had assiduously kept virtually all knowledge of the steady deterioration of our relations with Japan from becoming known to the commanders in Hawaii who would be responsible for implementing war plans. According to the written statement of Colonel Alfred McCormack, assigned by Stimson immediately after Pearl Harbor to organize a system for authoritative collation of all intelligence, lack of which before the attack seemed appalling, "When the sudden attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, it became apparent that the event had been clearly foreshadowed in the Japanese traffic of 1941."

As Admiral Nimitz wrote in *Seapower*, which he co-authored with Professor E. B. Potter, "At Pearl Harbor there was no premonition of the impending disaster. The warning of November 27th had indicated only that Washington expected Japan to make an aggressive move to the south, that is, toward the Philippines or Malaya. Accordingly, (Short) had taken precautions only against sabotage, and had so reported to Washington. Admiral Kimmel had been given no information which would justify interrupting a very urgent training program (to carry out WPL-46 against the Marshalls)."

Admiral Kimmel and General Short had made plans for the various contingencies they knew they should be prepared for. But they were deprived of the most important information of all: that an ultimatum had been delivered to Japan on the 26th of November; that a return ultimatum was to be delivered at 7:30 am (Hawaiian time) Sunday morning, and even possibly that some of our Washington officials knew, or had guessed, of the Sunday morning surprise that was on its terrible way. [See Appendix D for Captain Beach's handout on "The Bomb Plot Message."

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of Captain Larry Seaquist]

Thank you Captain Beach. Our next presenter is a retired surface warfare officer who had command of four warships, culminating with the command of the battleship USS *Iowa*. He has written several articles on accountability and command responsibility and is here to present a paper he has entitled "Embracing Accountability a Three Point Fix"

CAPT LARRY SEAQUIST, USN (RET.): [Proponent for accountability]

My task is to offer a portrait of accountability in its modern clothes. The accountability of naval and military officers is of great personal interest to me. It was my good fortune during my 32 years of naval service four times to command warships and thus to enjoy the personal tonic of accountability at length. Later service on the Joint Staff and then in the Office of the Secretary of Defense let me see the importance of military accountability in the other services and among our most senior civilian officials. And for the past five years, traveling much of the world on my current mission of conflict prevention, I have seen first hand in many countries both how exquisitely central is military accountability to the functioning of a democracy and how important is the example of the U.S. military in showing accountability at work.

Today I will keep a narrow focus on the accountability inside the U.S. Navy of commanding officers in the fleet and their operational commanders in the chain of command. As you will hear, I am rather alarmed about the disrepair into which this great iron principle has fallen in our wonderful Navy. Before proceeding, let me offer my view of the Kimmel question.

I suggest that while it may be perfectly legitimate for the Congress to recommend that the President restore Admiral Kimmel's rank as an act of political generosity, one cannot argue his case on technical grounds of naval accountability for two simple reasons:

First, Pearl Harbor was not an act of God, it was an act of the Japanese. The only escape from accountability is the "act of God" clause. Commanders are required to be *forehanded*—that is to foresee and prepare for even the most unlikely of contingencies.

Second, being forehanded about war with the Japanese was Admiral Kimmel's explicit mission. In accepting the assignment to replace Admiral Richardson, Admiral Kimmel knew that he was there *only* because Secretary Knox and President Roosevelt trusted him over Admiral Richardson to keep the fleet safely forward in Pearl Harbor in the face of an increasing Japanese threat.

Let me turn to my main task: What is accountability today?

Accountability is a severe but rather slippery concept. To some—even to some naval officers—accountability seems a quaint and unnecessary antique. To help us get a grip on it I will introduce briefly views from the inside—different ways an officer in command today can think about the exercise of accountability. I will then ask you to consider some problems the "iron principle" is going to run into in the years ahead and conclude with a couple of recommendations. You need not agree with this analysis. Our profession is in need of a vibrant debate about accountability and I look forward to hearing your own views in the discussion period.

Although we are going to focus on the risks today, especially the risk of being fired and having your career terminated, accountability has its pleasures. Remember, accountability is spelled T – R – U – S – T. Being trusted by your crew and your chain of command, and trusting yourself in command, are the real joys of command, the reasons why one keeps asking for the privilege again. Of course there is great risk, but nothing counterbalances the risks better than trusting that the successes of your crew are going to be as quickly noticed as a mishap.

So how does one in command navigate the risk-reward voyage of accountability day by day? This is a sea-going group so I need not remind you that a good navigator is constantly checking his position by shooting bearings on different objects. In command an officer can triangulate by looking:

- to the formal machinery of the Navy as a military organization; and
- to the informal, cultural norms of the profession; and
- to the expectations of American citizens.

I will briefly examine the processes of accountability that a commander finds as he looks in each of those three directions.

INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The Navy runs on paper and that is where institutional accountability is to be found—in the welter of directives, checklists, regulations, and law that constitute Navy SOP. An individual CO can deploy a simple hierarchy of risk questions as she or he exercises authority day by day:

The first is technical jeopardy: *Am I doing things correctly?* I’ve never forgotten the lecture I got from my first Chief Petty Officer on my first day in the Navy: “Son,” he said, “There is the right way, the wrong way and the Navy way—and I will tell you what the Navy way is!” Nowadays we have procedures for everything, including checklists to check the procedures and inspections to check the checklists.

I said at the outset that I was concerned about whether accountability itself has gone aground. We can see one of the problems right here: today’s Navy has too many checklists, too many inspections to check the checklists, and too little reliance on the professionalism of the Chief and the Captain. The inspection and checklist mentality cultivates the exact opposite of the qualities of judgment in command we want to weigh in the scales of accountability. We risk creating accountants, not captains. The good news is that Navy leaders recently vowed to fight this problem. Like pulling weeds from your garden this needs to be done constantly.

Let’s move on. Every CO is keenly aware that lurking beneath administrative procedure is the law.

At our second level of formal, institutional accountability the commander experiences legal jeopardy: *Am I acting legally? Could I be put on trial for what I am doing?* The mechanisms for putting a commander in the dock when his actions are believed to be not just improper but illegal start with the UCMJ and rest ultimately on the bedrock of Federal law and the Constitution.

Gripping as a trial may be, there is not much a courtroom can teach us about accountability. I started thinking about this after the *Kennedy-Belknap* collision in 1976. The *Belknap* CO took his case into a civilian court to argue, as I recall it, that he should not be held accountable for the mistakes of his bridge watch while he was in the shower—watchstanders that he had told not to make such errors. That was a real shock to the system.

That damage to inside-the-institution accountability was partly patched a few years later by Captain Sam Perlman. After he ran the cruiser *Leahy* aground on Old Fort Number 3 coming out of Yokosuka we were all holding our breath to see what he would do. Sam took his medicine—removal from command—honorably and did not go to court.

The problem is that a courtroom is a ring in which two adversaries fight to “win.” Truth and justice often get bruised and a fragile creature like accountability is certain to be trampled. Recall the recent spectacle in an Army court martial when what was ostensibly a trial of a senior NCO’s personal accountability in high office became merely a mud-fight as each side tried to dirty the other. That trial illuminated nothing about standards of conduct by leaders. So I reject the idea that accountability can be exacted through a trial—even when the injured officer claims to be putting the chain of command on trial.

Let’s keep moving on. Our tour now takes us to the inner sanctum—to the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the personnel regulations.

Here is where every commanding officer and every officer thinking about going to command experiences accountability most viscerally—job jeopardy: *Can I be removed from command right now?* The answer is a definite, unequivocal, *Yes! And not only removed, but removed summarily.* There need be no warning, there is no procedural protection. A simple loss of “confidence,” which need not be explained, is all that it takes for a senior to remove a junior in command. Why? Because that is the way the system works. Indeed, that is the way the system must work. The BuPers Manual makes it crystal clear that one has no hold on command at sea beyond that allowed by the trust and confidence of her or his chain of command.

From time to time, someone will contest this. I have already cited the *Belknap* case; you may also recall the Arnheiter case when the removal of the CO of USS *Vance* led to a great flap at the end of which Lieutenant Commander Arnheiter stayed fired and his chief defender, Captain Alexander, who was attempting to use the press to lever the Navy, lost his own orders to command battleship *New Jersey*. By sticking to their guns about standards of conduct in command Navy’s leaders did a lot to buttress accountability in the fleet. And importantly, the case involved conduct in a war zone so some very important, core values were at stake.

Please note that, much as it might seem arbitrary and capricious, the “confidence clause” in one’s orders to command is legally sound. As we were preparing for this seminar, the Historical Foundation circulated a long article by JAG Commander Roger D. Scott published in 1998 in the *Military Law Review*. In it, CDR Scott finds, both in the Constitution and in military necessity, rock-solid legal justification for this right of peremptory removal.

Before we leave the institutional framework we need to think about the place of investigations in the machinery of accountability. Investigations come in all sizes and shapes. They can be very public and political—like those in the Kimmel case—or very private and technical. Almost anyone in the chain of command from an individual CO to the Congress can charter one. The only constant is that a lot of trees are going to die every time one starts up!

If the incident under the microscope revolves around “the Navy way” an investigation can be quite useful. *How did this ship steam out of the channel and into the mud?* If a proper investigation concludes the CO neglected his navigation he is likely to be relieved “for cause.” The rest of us—after a moment of humility when we acknowledge that “there but for the grace of God go I”—are reminded of the importance of training a crackerjack navigation team.

But if you think about it, investigations are much better at checking up on organizations and procedures than they are at testing the trustworthiness of an individual commander. Recall the *Thresher* disaster. That investigation led to new standards of submarine construction and repair. Military aircraft crash investigations set an early standard for finding and fixing the cause of every mishap, which every airline passenger appreciates today. In fact, almost all our safety precautions are written in blood. All our ordnance safety procedures, for example, are lessons learned through the meticulous investigation of every munitions accident.

But not all investigations revolve around technical issues that can be handled by inside-the-family investigations. When things go wrong in a big way and in public investigations get very complicated very quickly.

Recall the 1988 case when the cruiser *Vincennes* shot down an Iranian airliner. Because it was so spectacular a tragedy and because there were real risks that the abrasive government of Iran—then at war with Iraq—would take this as a deliberate act of war by the U.S., JCS Chairman Admiral Crowe announced within a day that, from the information available to President Reagan, the Captain had acted properly in his belief that he was under attack. After giving the CO the highest-level support one can get, Admiral Crowe then announced as a seeming afterthought that there would, of course, be an investigation. It was no surprise that the closely watched investigating team—which knew the answer before they started asking the questions—came to an inconclusive end. The CO stayed in command even though even the mess cooks know that the only way to shoot down a civilian airliner is for there to be profound problems somewhere in the spectrum of judgment, training, and system design.

To this point in our survey of the machinery of accountability we can draw some early conclusions:

- Investigations and trials may be useful, but they do not deal well with individual accountability.
- These institutional mechanisms do not function well when there is lots of publicity and public controversy.

- We should be able to hang our hat on the elegant simplicity of professional trust. Navy's accountability procedures are strongest when they are nothing more than the chain of command affirming or withdrawing its confidence in a commander.

But can we trust that chain of command? Admiral Kimmel is often defended on the grounds that he was a scapegoat for higher ups. From time to time that charge is still heard today—indeed that seems to be the standard tactic of an officer who takes “the system” into court.

We have been shooting accountability hearings on various procedures inside the formal institution. Let us now swing around and orient ourselves by the informal, cultural norms of the profession. That is where we can look for an answer about the trustworthiness of the chain of command itself.

PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

To see how cultural norms in a profession can be distinct from but no less powerful than the formal mechanisms of the organization, look at another institution, NASA, much in the news the last few days. The investigation of the explosion of the Shuttle Challenger laid that problem ultimately on a management climate—we would call it a chain of command—which had become overconfident and slack in its safety procedures. Or consider the Marines. We all know that every Marine, young and old, wakes up every morning with one first, piercing thought: *If I am not absolutely perfect today, it could be the end of the Marine Corps!* That is accountability. At some point early in their career, each new Marine buys into that culture and, in an important way, remains an accountable Marine for the rest of his or her life.

We Navy officers also have a strong professional culture, if perhaps one with less drama. Of course, we sub-divide ourselves into different tribes—aviation, submarine, surface, intelligence, and so on. When we look for attitudes about accountability we need to be alert to some subtle differences among these strongly self-socialized groups.

In general the service reputation of an aviator centers on his skills and accomplishments in the air. So too, for submariner, although the solo, undersea operations and classified missions of submarines create a culture in which the “silent service” talks mostly to itself.

You would probably agree with me that we could expect an aviation admiral to almost instinctively keep the operational skills and combat leadership potential of a subordinate front and center if there is a question whether that subordinate should continue in command. And, to be a bit indelicate, we would probably hedge our bets a little if that admiral up inside the chain of command were a submariner—not knowing whether the senior officer would react as an operational officer or as a Rickover-school, checklist *uber alles* man.

But I wonder if this operational ethic is eroding. Let me illustrate this concern with my own tribe—the surface community. Many of my fellow ship drivers have worried in print for a decade or more that the surface community is developing a shore duty, careerist orientation. This would be following the “...From the Sea” strategy so far ashore that reputations hang mostly on success in Washington. In such a climate, command at sea becomes more a ticket punch than an end in itself. If there is a

“careerist” problem. A smaller fleet means fewer command slots and great pressure to shorten command tours in order to squeeze more officers through the bottleneck.

Why should this concern us today? Because accountability radiates through the Navy from the individual commanding officers of combat units at sea—that is what makes us different from a container ship line. And accountability will not radiate anywhere if it is blanketed by a chain of command which treats command at sea as something to be done for the shortest possible time and with the least possible risk between jobs in Washington.

I will leave it the historians here today to judge whether the command climate in Admiral Kimmel’s time had itself lost some of its sea-going combat edge and therefore was lax in supporting him.

One final, current example may help underscore the crucial role played by our professional culture. Last Friday in Bogotá the Congress of Colombia passed a law which holds military officers and police accountable if any citizens in their custody “disappear.” The military fought this law for eleven years. It was not until this year that the new commander of the Armed Forces, General Fernando Tapias, took up the cause and insisted that his officers be held to this standard so that there could be no blurring of the lines between the military and the assassination and kidnapping squads of the paramilitaries and the guerrillas. We want to make sure in the American military that we are never required by law to do what our professional culture should make automatic and instinctive.

Now let’s finish this exercise in professional navigation by getting a fix on accountability by looking in a third direction—to the American people themselves.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

In the American Navy, the bedrock of accountability is the notion that a commanding officer and those in the chain of command are also responsible *down*—to the crews for their safety and well-being. This precept derives directly from our long-standing tradition of the citizen-soldier. Our Founding Fathers explicitly rejected the European tradition of a professional officer caste that put its own stature and survival above that of troops drawn forcibly from the peasantry. Instead, in our democracy the military leader’s *authority over* his troops is explicitly linked to a parallel *responsibility to* them as fellow citizens. Remember, accountability is spelled T – R – U – S – T. There is no better sign of this trust than reenlistment. I am sure there are many in the audience today whose happiest Navy memories are of reenlistment ceremonies where sailors and their families reaffirmed that trust. And I’m sure I’m not the only old timer here today alarmed at today’s low reenlistment rates. When our crews start voting with their feet we need to listen very carefully.

And of course, we have a piercing obligation to all of America’s citizen-taxpayers to uphold and exhibit those special qualities that make America’s democracy such a powerful and important example to peoples all over the world. We ignore Americans and their standards at our peril. We all recall the Tailhook scandals. The real damage of Tailhook was that the morality on display was exactly at odds with the public’s expectations of its military officers.

And here, in the public conscience, is where we can find another fatal weakness in the Kimmel case. What do those who support Admiral Kimmel plan to say to the families of those who died at Pearl Harbor under his command?

A FIX

Let us plot these various bearings. As we look around the horizon of accountability—to the Navy's administrative framework, to our professional culture, and to our crews, their families, and their neighbors—are we sailing right up the center of the accountability channel?

While I can see several reasons to take heart, I also see some trouble signs—especially one very big one: the *Iowa* tragedy. I ask you to consider *Iowa* for a moment in this forum because, like Kimmel, the events raise profound questions of accountability. Unlike Kimmel, those accountability questions hang directly over the head of Navy's leaders today.

I am not going to argue the *Iowa* case here. But I will ask you to think about it. In the ten years since 47 men died in Turret Two in battleship *Iowa* a great deal of new information has come into the record. If we invoke the benchmarks that I have outlined this morning you will find some astonishing problems of accountability. The information now becoming available to us points to:

- an investigation and review process that was deliberately misdirected by senior officers to avoid finding out what happened, seemingly in order to avoid budget cuts and ship reductions from Congress.
- a callous, deliberate campaign which—ignoring all the facts—not only branded one sailor as a mad killer and cruelly attacked his family with deliberate leaks of false information to the press, but misrepresented the deaths to the other families, then turned on the entire ship's crew and trashed them as well, and finished by sending two other battleship crews into combat in the Gulf War without alerting them to the toxic hazard that had caused more than half the deaths in *Iowa*. And,
- a professional culture which accepted and defended these illegal acts, even to the point of lying under oath to the Congress about them.

In my view, Navy will never get back on track in the ethics department until these terrible, terribly unprofessional, and very uncharacteristic wrongs have been righted. The public needs to be able to see our Navy for what it is: a service full of honorable officers living ethical, accountable professional lives.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Let's finish by looking ahead. As this wonderful Navy of ours steams into the future, what kinds of accountability problems lie ahead? Here are just two of the many new challenges waiting for the next generation of Navy commanders:

First, the chain of command is becoming fuzzy. When the *Iowa* crew and I sailed in the Straits of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq war, my embarked commander at one time was an Air Force General. And he was working for an Army general in Florida. In Bosnia and Kosovo we see chains of command today that mix officers from many different countries

and many different military cultures. We are going to have to be very careful to safeguard our own accountability standards in these new settings.

Second, the boundary between military and civilian is being erased. Our ethics and the laws of war are organized around the idea that the military folks are kept carefully separated from civilians. But new forms of conflict and new, long-range weapons intermix the two. Recall from the air strikes, which mistakenly attacked civilian trains in Serbia and the Chinese embassy in downtown Belgrade during last Spring's air war against Milosevic. It is going to be very difficult to untangle such mistakes in the future. We do not have international, cross-service procedures or habits that equip us to run such problems to ground and fix them so they do not happen next time.

What can we do to be ready for these demanding, non-traditional stresses on our professionalism?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accountability is quality, not a product, so signing out new directives will not have much effect. My sole recommendation is that you each think about accountability and help encourage a vigorous spirit of accountability in our Navy—indeed, in all our Services.

In recent years I have spent a great deal of time talking with senior military officers and government leaders in several of the world's trouble spots. In Central Asia I meet with officers who until a few years ago were part of the Soviet army. Now they are trying to build new, independent democracies. In the Middle East I work with the Chairman of the Jordanian Joint Chiefs of Staff—a military with a long record of supplying peacekeepers to international problem areas. And in Colombia I am working with military officers and civilian leaders committed to trying to bring a just and durable peace to a country which has been at war for decades. In every working visit to every one of the places I see again how supremely important is the model of the U.S. military—the military of a democracy. I have come to believe that our standards are probably our most important product. When we deploy a Navy battle group we are deploying a wonderful, powerful example of democracy in action.

Nothing makes that example shine brighter than our culture of accountability. Nothing will tarnish us faster than becoming casual about accountability. You can each help safeguard the “iron principle” by helping those in command today remember the central importance of accountability.

Thank you, I look forward to the discussion and to learning your own views.

ADM BROOKS: [intermission]

Thank you Captain Seaquist. Before we turn to our panel of commentators now would be a good time to take a short break--and I emphasize short--as we want to have plenty of time for Q&A. Be also aware that we do have media outside so please be courteous and aware of any interviews that they may want to conduct.

FIFTEEN MINUTE INTERMISSION

RADM BROOKS: [Reconvene colloquium]

Our first panelist is a veteran retired intelligence officer who served in the Navy during World War II and the Cold War. Rear Admiral Mac Showers.

RADM MAC SHOWERS: [Panelist comments and questions]

Thank you, Tom. I'm not going to make any statement, but I would like to clarify the fact that in my questions and in my concerns on Admiral Kimmel's matter, I deal almost exclusively in the intelligence field, because that's the area I know best. And about which I've learned a lot working with Commander Rochefort, Captain Layton, later Admiral Layton, and Jasper Holmes. Although I wasn't in Hawaii at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack nor the months preceding it, I worked all during the war with people who were there and who knew those facts intimately.

I have two or three quick questions of the people who presented this morning. First, if I may go back to Randy's discussion of the situation, I would like to know what causes you to identify the controversial role of intelligence in military operations? I didn't know it was controversial.

My next question is to Mr. David Hatch. And this is simply for clarification. I think there is an error made on the part of many people who hear about this situation and also some historians who write about it. As to the percentage of code groups who recovered in an effort, in a cryptologic effort, against any given system, and whether that is equivalent to the percentage of message texts that become readable as a result of those recoveries.

At the beginning of World War II as a result of efforts in the Philippines and in Washington, and with the British and Dutch, the information is that we had recovered perhaps 10-15% of JN25 code groups. If you would write a letter only using 10% of the words in the dictionary, I challenge you to complete your task. We were not reading 10% or 15% of the text of JN25 messages in those days.

Those are my main questions for clarification. I will pass on to other members of the panel and I reserve the right to come back with other questions later.

(The two responses were not captured for transcription)

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of Dr. Rosenberg]

Our next panelists is a well known historian who teaches here in Washington at the National War College. He currently is completing a biography on Admiral Arleigh Burke.

DR. DAVID ROSENBERG [Panelist comments]:

Thank you, sir. I think I'm in a unique position here and that I'm struck with the interesting fact that even though I am a reservist, I am, in fact, the only serving naval officer on this panel. I am Executive Officer of the naval intelligence unit out in Suitland, Maryland. As a result in thinking about my responsibilities in that area, I am going to talk from two different viewpoints. One is a historian, and one as a naval officer in terms of thinking about the questions that one should be asking as one thinks about the issue of whether or not Admiral Kimmel should be restored to his prior rank and the record clarified.

First of all, thanks to Naval Historical Foundation for holding this, as a naval historian who has been a member the foundation for 33 years, I note that this is a wonderful occurrence and I hope that we do more of it. I thank Admiral Dunn, Dave Winkler and Todd Creekman for doing it.

On a note from a historian who has worked long and hard on studying various aspects of military planning and even naval intelligence, even working with the participants, I always find it frustrating because of the fact that it is impossible to truly recreate the past.

In something like this controversy that we are dealing with today, it's even tougher. Because the fact is the ground has been plowed so many times, and while there may still be somewhere on a microfilm most likely in government archives, something that may, in fact, bear light on this subject, it is, in fact, unlikely.

The fact of the matter is, you do not have the day-to-day workings of how people thought and what they said and what they did at the time. People just don't keep those kinds of logs. So the fact is, we have questions. Such as whether or not there was this alleged meeting the night before the attack on Pearl Harbor in the White House between the President and his key advisers.

In looking at this and thinking it through, I wanted to suggest, in fact, that there are four issues relating, if you want to parse the questions about Admiral Kimmel. There are four questions that I think we should be thinking about. How to think about the Kimmel problem? I would suggest that the parts of this problem are as follows.

The first issue is the question whether Admiral Kimmel's strategic problem and political problem as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with respect to the situation in terms of his broader responsibilities vis-à-vis, worrying about Japan in terms of facing the possibility of war, and in dealing with his seniors back in Washington, D.C.

Clearly as we look at this, the command relationships were, in hindsight, inadequate in terms of dealing with the problems. As Admiral Burke once said to me, about the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961. When I initially drafted something I had been working on, tried to,

in effect, to put him in a good light as compared to other members of the Kennedy administration, he said, "Don't make me a hero. This was a government-wide failure." And in the same sense, Pearl Harbor was a government-wide failure, and should be thought of that way.

Secondly, there is an issue, and I will return to this again, of the question of withholding of intelligence data. Compartmentalization is a way of life in the intelligence business. There is always some other compartment that one can always appeal to that will always indicate, that may or may not be something that will say that there is something that I cannot tell you. The famous line, I cannot tell you or I would have to kill you, kind of stems from this in the sense that there is always the implication that there is something else out there. What happened was compartmentalization was used horribly by the United States intelligence community at Pearl Harbor in terms of what was and was not shared with the operational commanders. As an old friend of the late Roger Peneau having read and reviewed Admiral Layton's book, which was largely assisted by my good friend and colleague to the right, Admiral Showers, it is absolutely clear that intelligence compartmentalization was done very badly. And certainly, it is very, very likely, but not absolutely sure that if Admiral Kimmel, then Commander Layton, had certain intelligence information, especially specific data about what was being asked about the disposition of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, certain command decisions might, in fact, have come out that would have changed this. So there is that issue and it is a key part of all of it.

The third issue is the ambiguity of the war warnings that Ned Beech so ably pointed out in terms of dealing with the July warning of 1940 and then the other warnings that came in and how arguably mealy-mouthed they were. Maybe this was a problem of an American government worried about crying wolf in a difficult time. Or there may have been, in fact, more political, of if we want to play with it, possibly more sinister things at work. I don't believe so. I do believe there is this problem of how these things are, in fact, written. Often they can, in fact, be put together by a committee and so there are problems. But again, this is something that we cannot recreate. But certainly, Admiral Kimmel was not well served by the ambiguity of the war warnings.

However, when you finally come down to it, there is also the smaller picture, if you will. And that is the question of Kimmel's responsibility as commander of the Pacific Fleet, and what he needed to do with the Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7th or that weekend December 6-7, 1941. And clearly thanks to the excellent remarks of Bob Love, in terms of dealing with other commanders and what they did and what went on, it is clear that Admiral Kimmel did not do as much as other commanders in terms of putting his forces on alert.

It is clear, it is known that Admiral Halsey clearly got the word on the war warning. Halsey was Commander, Aircraft Carrier Battle Force. But the problem is, what happened to Admiral Newton, what happened to Admiral Wilson Brown? They did not go to sea necessarily with their forces on that kind of alert. And more importantly, what about Admiral Bellinger? In terms of the man responsible with aircraft patrol force, U.S.

fleet, and so forth, in terms of what he was not informed? There may have, in fact, been failures in Kimmel's command headquarters and beyond it that raise questions, but that having been said, there are issues of what Kimmel might have done in this area.

But then we get down to the bottom line. What difference would it have been made? And that's the other problem. In Ned Beech's excellent comments, there are some questions in terms of the reduction of American casualties. But the question is: could this, in fact, have made a difference in preventing the attack on Pearl Harbor? No. It would not have done that. There still would have been a major Japanese attack and more than likely there would have been, in fact, a disaster occurring for American forces.

So where should we go on this? I thought long and hard about this in preparing for it, read a good bit over it, was leaning toward exonerating Admiral Kimmel to a great extent, but have come down to the following viewpoints with the following three reasons.

I believe that the Dorn Report, as an official review of the circumstances have, in fact, spread the blame officially for Pearl Harbor widely. They have pointed out the difficulties and the problems that are involved and has indicated that Admiral Kimmel was not solely at fault. It was not solely his responsibility. But I believe, and now I'm shifting to my naval officer viewpoint, that there are issues that one should keep in mind when one considers the question of exonerating the commander in tactical command, building my report on Larry Sequist's comments, as we look to the 21st century. And there are three issues that it comes down to.

One question is the fact that what are commanders supposed to be doing at the brink of war? We expect of our American forces today, not simply to fight and win wars, but to dissuade enemies from even thinking of undertaking them and deterring them from doing so.

Admiral Kimmel certainly was not involved in doing that. No, that's putting a contemporary charge on him. But the question is, what's the lesson to be given if we restore this individual to a four-star rank? What is the lesson to be sent to the students that I teach who are, in fact mostly, post-command, commanders who are moving to high rank at the National War College?

And I think that this would not be a good message to send because the demands for the future are even greater than they were in Pearl Harbor and clearly it was a failure on Kimmel's part as a commander.

The second aspect of this relates to the question of withholding of intelligence. And I will, in fact, excuse Admiral Kimmel in terms of the question of what he knew and what he didn't know, and what was being withheld from him. But as a historian and intelligence officer, I actually would like to put out to the people under my charge this point. As a historian, I indicate to my students, that there are responsible not just for what's in the archives, but what's not there. In other words, they need to know their subject well enough so they can ask the question, was there a meeting the night before

Pearl Harbor or were there messages that might have come through? As a naval intelligence officer whose job is not only deep penetration of the target, but in the words of Admiral Bill Studeman, deep penetration of the customer because that's almost as important. The fact of the matter is that the customer needs to understand what intelligence can and cannot do. Ask questions and always be aware of what, in fact, might be out there. And I do believe in this case, this is also another problem. Not, in fact, putting any blame on the great and good, Admiral Layton, and so forth. The fact of the matter is that the message that this would send, I believe, to operators who even now after the Cold War are somewhat divorced from the intricacies and understanding of intelligence sources and analysis. Who, in fact, are working in a move toward this sense of an absolute transparent battlefield through sensors and networks and communications that this would send the wrong message as well as to what commanders know, should know, and should expect about intelligence. Just to point out, Bob Love's comments were superb in terms of the question relating to war warnings and so forth, about comparing Admiral King albeit only down in Norfolk and Admiral Kimmel.

And the final point gets down to the issues that Larry Sequist raised. And that is the issue of a commander's responsibility and the responsibility that we have as a generation looking back and then looking forward, in sending a message to those who will follow us in a position of command. And that message is, we are responsible, we are in command, and that we must, in effect, accept that accountability, that trust, and go forward with that.

I once asked Admiral Burke after a friend of mine was, in fact, relieved of command and his naval career ruined because his destroyer basically had a disastrous collision with a reef, taking off its sonar dome and screws down in the AUTECH range, because the fact of the matter is, he happened to step off the bridge at the wrong time to use the head. And it was this question that says, wait a minute, this guy wasn't there, he couldn't have prevented it. His officer of the deck gave the wrong command, they turned right instead of left and this happened. And Admiral Burke simply put it, he was a captain, everything that happened on that ship was his responsibility. And in the end, in this case, Admiral Kimmel was responsible for the disposition of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Savvy Cooke was ready, but the Fleet more broadly was not. Thanks.

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of Norman Polmar]

Thank you Dave. Let's move on to Norman Polmar who is self-described as an intergalactically known writer and historian.

MR. NORMAN POLMAR: [Panelist comments]

First of all, I must say that my comment to Admiral Brooks about just saying he's an intergalactic known writer and historian, came about because Tom's original introduction for me was, and now we get the dope from Washington.

But on this very serious subject, listening to my predecessors here, the question keeps coming to my mind, what did Kimmel know?

Here is a man who has spent twenty-some years in the Navy, Naval War College, commander of battleships, he knew the war plans inside out. He obviously had to know, I believe, that from 1928, when *Langley* led carrier strikes against Pearl Harbor and got away with it--a surprise attack. Through 1938, almost every year our Fleet attacked Pearl Harbor or the Canal Zone and they always got away with it.

They always surprised the defending force. Indeed in 1936, discussing this, Admiral Reeves, Joseph Reeves who was the founder of modern U.S. naval carrier aviation, at the time Commander of the Battle Force and later Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Reeves said that if we ever get into a war with Japan, they would strike first on a weekend.

This is right after one of these carrier exercises of striking Pearl Harbor. If Kimmel read, he had to in those days read the Naval Institute *Proceedings*, there was nothing else to read about his profession, there were several articles, especially a landmark article in 1937, the August issue, called "Aerial Attacks on Fleets."

The profession knew this was how it would start. Now as I say from '28-'38, every year the Fleet would bring the Atlantic and Pacific ships together for a major exercise, almost every year they went after the Canal Zone or Pearl Harbor and they always got through.

Secondly, he had to have known that in November of 1940, at Taranto a single British carrier knocked out three Italian battleships in a surprise attack. These were things that everyone who read a newspaper knew.

Next, Kimmel himself wrote a security plan in October 1941, which appears in his book, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, that his October 1941 plan for "security of Fleet at base and at operating areas, states in the second paragraph, that a declaration of war may be preceded by: one, a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor." He had to have known. Next the war warning message was a different message than any other message ever sent to a commander in the field in that period. As Admiral [Samuel Eliot] Morison points out, an unprecedented phrase was used in the very first sentence, which is, "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

Not, a fence straddler saying things might heat up as did previous messages. The first sentence, "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning."

Next, we did not know where the Japanese Fleet was except for the fact that they broadcast regularly. And we were able to identify code signs of certain ships, not all, and because of the traffic, with those code signs for the ships, or code names, we could tell roughly where certain ships are.

On December 1st, they changed all of these code signs for their ships, and on December 2nd, Kimmel met with his intelligence officer, then Commander Layton. Layton handed him a list of the latest intercepts of code names and where they thought ships were. And

Kimmel says, there are no carriers on here. But all of this is in Layton's book *And I was there*. Layton said, "No sir, we don't know where their carriers are." And Kimmel said, "You mean, they could be coming around Diamond Head right now?" Carriers and carrier strikes in Pearl Harbor should have been on his mind.

Finally, I want to make a few comments about the condition within the Fleet on December 7th. Things in my mind that were the direct responsibility of the Fleet commander. There were on December 7th, more ships in Pearl Harbor than in any time in the past, at least, six months. Most of their crews were ashore, half of the captains of the battleships were not on board. Indeed the only battleship to get underway, the *Nevada*, was commanded by a reserve lieutenant commander.

The two carriers were out. Kimmel had sent them out, not Washington. He had been told to reinforce with Army airplanes, then changed to Marine at Midway and at Wake Island. If the Japanese had waited about three or more hours, they would have caught the *Enterprise*, as she was steaming in the direction of Pearl Harbor, about 150 miles out at the time of the attack.

There was a lack of what I call operational readiness. That morning the destroyer *Ward* and a PBY flying boat had attacked and sunk a Japanese submarine. The messages sent to Fleet headquarters or to District headquarters and then Fleet, and Districts had a very different role in those days than what they have today and that's important. The message was not, we think we saw a submarine or hey, there's something out here fellows. It was "have attacked and sunk a submarine in the restricted operating area."

What happens to the message? It's sent off right away by a PBY and a destroyer. And the message gets a little lost, gets a little garbled, gets to Fleet headquarters and they say well, we'll call the Admiral, see if he wants to come in.

But the desk officer did take action. He told the stand-by destroyer to get underway. No orders as to what it was to do, but one ship in the harbor had steamed up for an emergency, it was a destroyer. Went out to help the *Ward*. What was the attitude in the Fleet? As I read the memoirs not of the senior officers, but of the enlisted men, I find things like this from the survivor of the *Oklahoma*.

This is his thoughts on December 7th, "What is this? Drills on Sunday? In port? Ask a thousand incredulous voices and pairs of eyes. Planes were dropping bombs on Ford Island. Our planes? They had to be. How else could you account for it? What the Hell are they doing? Of course, all the sailors thought they were Army planes dropping bombs.

The point is that Kimmel had to know. He had to know a lot about what the world was doing at that moment, what his Fleet was doing, and what he should be doing. In my opinion based on some of the things that were said here, and a lot of what I have read over the years and especially, the last couple of weeks, he did not know what was happening, and he did not know what to do.

We heard how Brereton sent half his B17s to Mindinao Isle to get them out of Japanese range. Hart took his PBYS and sent them to all over the Philippines so they couldn't be struck.

Wake Island got a couple of hours notice. The Marine commander, Putnam, had twelve fighters. He put four of them on airborne alert. Those four were not destroyed in the first attack, whereas seven of the eight on the ground were destroyed. And he was able to inflict a lot of damage. Could an hour's notice have let the other radar stations, which were shut down, there were several on the island, be activated? Could a couple hours notice let them work out a plan to keep twenty or thirty P40s aloft? We had 70 or 80 on the island. Things could have been done.

Let me conclude with what was happening in Washington. The central villain was unquestionably, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief. Commander-in-Chief gets the top responsibility and it was his staff, his structure, but I cannot accept that he wanted this to happen. The worst thing that could have happened from Franklin D. Roosevelt's viewpoint was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The worst thing. Why?

Obviously, he wanted to fight Hitler. He wanted to save Britain. Imagine if the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, killed a couple thousand Americans, sunk four battleships, hit four others, Congress the next day would have declared war on Japan. Which it did. Then every ship, every aircraft, every bullet, every soldier, would have gone to the Pacific except that Hitler stupidly declared war. He didn't have to. Japan didn't declare war on Russia when he invaded Russia in June of '41. He had no requirement to. How did Roosevelt know Hitler would declare war? Because if Hitler had not declared war, Congress would have forced every bullet, every ship, every soldier into the Pacific and in 1942, Britain would have gone down the tubes.

RADM BROOKS: [Introduction of Dr. John Prados]

Dr. Prados is a highly respected military and intelligence historian who has written several books on Vietnam and World War II. I am an admirer of him for his recent book *Combined Fleet Decoded*, which details the important role cryptology played in the Pacific theater during the Second World War. Dr. Prados, the floor is yours.

DR. JOHN PRADOS: [Panelist Comment and questions]

My marching orders in this session are a little bit different. I was supposed to listen up to what everybody was saying and then cross-examine them at the end. I'm going to preface that by saying on the specific subject of Kimmel and what happened to him, I'm kind of agnostic, because I understand the whole argument about command responsibility, but on the other hand I do think Kimmel was screwed.

Now there are a couple of things in recent historiography that kind of cloud the issues here. One of them is the discovery in U.S. records in the past couple of years. A file of

messages, from Japanese communications traffic that we intercepted before the war. These were pre-war Japanese messages and their traffic in the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. We did not, in fact, decode and read until after the war was over. A lot of people who had gone into the Pearl Harbor question and thought about it in the past few years, have looked at these post-war decryptive messages and assumed that we could have somehow read these before the war, and this would have told us the truth about what was happening at Pearl Harbor. That's just not true.

With that, I'm going to swing into my questions and they go to the all the different folks here.

DR. PRADOS: [Question to Dr. Papadopoulos]

You know, the question of negligence in law is a good thing that you bring that up. This is a key factor in the way we judge the Kimmel controversy and how we respond and come out on the question of what happened to Kimmel. It is less well known, perhaps, that there are different concepts in law of what negligence is. There is sort of a pure concept of negligence, which is that anything that you do or don't do is negligent. There is also a sort of contributory concept of negligence, ie, something that I did might have contributed to the final outcome of a situation and how much did of what you did contribute to the final outcome of the situation? And then, do you weigh these two things in coming to your judgements of what is the final outcome of a situation? So for Randy Papadopoulos, which kind of concept of negligence do you believe in and how would you say that negligence contributes to our understanding of Pearl Harbor?

DR. PAPADOPOULOS: [Response]

Amazingly, that what I am talking about when I deal with the fact of negligence, essentially is the idea of under court law, in fact, that people can make, even well-meaning people, well-intended people, who think they are restoring themselves as necessary to restore themselves in an unfortunate situation, can still be found liable for negligence.

In that case, to answer your question, I would use the second category you were talking about, contributory negligence. That in fact, Admiral Kimmel added something to the equation by his actions that made the result of the Japanese attack, qualitatively different. That's the way that I evaluated that. I am exploring this issue of negligence very closely. It's very new for me. My experience, I'm not a lawyer, and my specialty is submarines, so from this point of view, I'm going to defer. But it is an interesting avenue to take. And if we could have put Admiral Kimmel in court--remember he declined a court martial I think in 1945, because he wanted to wait for the investigations of Congress--If we had put Admiral Kimmel to court martial, he could have made sessions of this sort.

Moreover, the Roberts Commission, I mentioned in my presentation, is conducted by Chairman Olan Roberts. Olan Roberts is a Supreme Court Justice of the United States.

He is thinking in these terms and could well have found Kimmel guilty in his own mind on that basis. It's a lawyer discussing military officer behavior.

DR. PRADOS: [Question to Mr. Hatch]

Very good. For Mr. Hatch. The idea that there was a conspiracy and the notion that Winston Churchill, for example, was behind dragging the Americans into the war and this contributed to certain actions that FDR did or did not take in the last days before Pearl Harbor. Is importantly effected by not only the degree with which U.S. naval intelligence was reading JN25B, but also the extent to which the British were reading JN25B and what the British did or did not tell us through Churchill or through people deputized by him, about their knowledge of Japanese actions. Missing in our earlier discussion was any kind of understanding of what Churchill knew and the degree of Anglo-American cooperation on JN25B.

MR. HATCH: [Response]

There was a minimal amount of American and British cooperation in exploiting JN25. It was mostly an exchange of information. An exchange of recoveries of code groups from the code book. I'm not sure Winston Churchill was much informed about the progress on JN25. He was concerned with the war against Hitler. He was very well informed about the decrypts from the German enigma and other German systems. I'm not sure he was as concerned about JN25 and the Pearl Harbor period.

There were exchanges between the American Navy and the British Navy and we have seen their records. They were no more advanced than we were. We were kind equal to each other, making recoveries. But there was no great advantage of the British side. They were not ahead of us in any way.

DR. PRADOS: [Question for VADM Richardson about the Japanese Fleet]

For Admiral Richardson, I thought your presentation was quite good and straight forward; however, there were some aspects I think ought to be underlined or brought out with somewhat more relief. For example, in the whole issue of the Pearl Harbor attack, one of the key aspects is the question as to why did we miss the Japanese Fleet to the north? In the Spring of 1941, there was a report done by Admiral Bellinger who was the patrol wing commander and the Army-Air Force commander, General Martin, a report you referred to in your remarks. But you sort of slide past that. I wonder if you won't give us some more background about Bellinger-Martin Report on the air assets at Pearl Harbor and how that effects our overall analysis?

VADM RICHARDSON: [Response]

Let me tell you what the problem is, and we do have in the audience here today, an expert on that, Professor Gannon. But the problem was simply this. The aircraft were 275 miles out roughly at launch, that was at first light because in those days, squadrons had to form

up, planes and squadrons, squadrons and strike groups, fighter protection, then left roughly 45 minutes after launch started. The planes left to go in. That put them in Pearl Harbor just around 8:00. The ships came in at 25 knots. Two hundred and seventy-five miles out, plus 300 miles more, meant that they were 575 miles out at dusk the night before. They were detectable at distances from 575 to about 700 miles by patrol planes. PBVs were slow planes. I thought the speeds were around 90 knots, Professor Gannon tells me they were capable of 120 knots. It takes 6-7-8 hours flying time before you reach an area where you can detect those planes. For some reason, Secretary Knox picked out a sector of 128 degrees as the sector that should have been covered, but that left out 232 degrees that had no coverage at all. He picked a separation between planes of 25 miles. In that area were the Northeast Trades scudding cumulous clouds, it's very, very difficult to spot naval forces at sea. White caps. You've got to get within 5-7 miles to see them, I've had that experience for many, many years, and I know that is the case.

Now, Bellinger was indeed an expert. He made an appraisal. Admiral Kimmel consulted with him. He made his decision on the basis of two things. One, these patrol planes were essential to his wartime commitment that he assault positions in the Marshall Islands and the patrol planes provided surveillance and added warfare protection for him. There is no basis that I know of that Admiral Kimmel was in any way opposed to what his air commanders told him. If I'm wrong in that, I ask Professor Gannon to correct me.

The idea that Admiral Kimmel was so casual in the ways that you heard from Mr. Polmar are without foundation and, in fact, they are instructions to serve preconceived ideas about what really went wrong. Unfortunately, we have had here, as I've heard, a he said-she said sort of thing with very little opportunity to counter the points that are being made and I hope that in some way we can find an opportunity to do that. There are many, many misstatements. At least, according to the information that I have. Maybe I'm making some. But I would love the opportunity and in the interest in getting an accurate record of these many things we've heard, I would love an opportunity to be provided to make points and counter points and then let the chips fall where they may.

RADM BROOKS SWITCHES FORMAT TO AUDIENCE Q&A: [Calls on RADM Hill]

I'm Admiral Hill. And I have a bias in the sense that my first commanding officer when I reported Submarine Seventh Fleet, was the son of Admiral Kimmel, Manning Kimmel, I wanted to go to sea with him on *Bravado*, but my name was already put on *Ray* and the *Bravado* was lost. I was lucky in that regard.

But at any event, I plan to get involved in this business was to go back and forth before Admiral Moorer and Admiral Richardson, and others, so I do have a great interest. In the business of accountability, and I speak for every naval officer here I know, we all accept accountability without question. But, and I am a holder of one letter of caution and one letter of reprimand, but I still made it because people knew that I accepted accountability, but forgave me. God knows how many other mistakes I made as well. Nobody can say they would be perfect from the circumstances that we found Admiral Kimmel in at that time. I go back to Admiral Moorer and saying, Admiral Nelson would have been no

different. But my question is again, to Admiral Richardson, would you give us the benefit of your analysis on accountability?

VADM RICHARDSON: [Response]

With pleasure. I was misinformed. I was told that Captain Sequist was on the other side, but as I heard him on accountability, I realized that he is one of our very best presenters. Yes, by all means let's have accountability. Full accountability, not partial accountability, but full accountability.

There was a substantial step taken in that very direction by Mr. Dorn in his report of December 1995 when he said, on his first conclusion in the report was that "responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not be borne by Admiral Kimmel and General Short alone, others were also to blame." But who were those others? What faults, what errors did they commit and how did the errors committed in Washington impact on those alleged to Admiral Kimmel? When we get that on the record we will then know where the fault is, who's to blame, and whether or not Admiral Kimmel and General Short were, in fact, scapegoated? When that's done, and by an administration, and when you read some books you will find much of that out. Some of the information still is not available. Most of it's out, but when we get that in the record it will be clear to, I think, just about everybody that the blame for Pearl Harbor was not Admiral Kimmel's or General Short's.

DOC ELLARD: [Question to VADM Richardson]

My name is Doc Ellard and I'm from Mobile, Alabama. Admiral Richardson, if I may sir, I was paying attention when you were talking, but I would appreciate it if you would wade through some of that water again, particularly with regard to the inadequacy of the war warning to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

VADM RICHARDSON: [On war warning]

We know from the history books that a proper war warning was actually issued in June of 1940 by General Marshall. I'm going to read what the first sentence said. General Marshall sent a war warning out to General Short's predecessor, General Heron, and he said, "immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible" and then he goes into without scaring the local population, and so forth. He perfectly well knew how to send a proper war warning, what he did, what they did, and that war warning was composed not just by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, but by FDR, by both Secretaries, everybody was in the act on composing that war warning, which may be one reason why it ended as vaguely as it was. But, look at the thing this way. If the intelligence that was available in Washington had been regularly sent out to Admiral Kimmel, then Admiral Kimmel, who's basic responsibility, most fundamental responsibility was the integrity of his force and the lives of the people entrusted to him. Admiral Kimmel on the basis of the actual intelligence that was available in Washington, would have been entirely within his authority to do any number

of different things. To protect his force and the President and nobody else could have countermanded that or they would have had to countermand it, they would have had to relieve him after that was done because he acted in their view, improperly. By sending him information through the mail, personal letters, unclassified, Admiral Stark attempted in whatever way he could, to keep him updated on what was happening in Washington. Invariably, 3-5-8 days late. But that process denied Kimmel his most basic responsibility. Denied him the opportunity to execute his most basic responsibility. That was the unfortunate thing about the way they actually handled that.

DR. PRADOS: [Question to VADM Richardson on prior knowledge]

What intelligence was there in Washington that could have been available to Kimmel that would have pointed directly to Pearl Harbor, prior to the knowledge the previous day of the Japanese 14 point message?

VADM RICHARDSON: [comment on prior knowledge]

Pearl Harbor was never specifically mentioned in any of the messages that were decoded. But, common knowledge all of us knew that Pearl Harbor was likely to be attacked. When I was out there, whenever *Yorktown* was in port I flew dawn and dusk patrol. At sea, of course, we didn't. But when we were in port, we did. There was broad scale knowledge and Kimmel also knew that Pearl Harbor was a prospective attack target and many Fleet exercises had demonstrated the fact that all concerned that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to surprise air attack. Common knowledge was that planes launched at first light and then as I mentioned a few minutes ago, had to join up in the attack. You don't delay that until 10:00 or 11:00 or 2:00 in the afternoon, or anything like that. You do it as soon as you can after a quick run in, after all this was a surprise attack, and the only area in the entire world that was significant at 7:30 that morning. Knowing what we all knew, and took for granted about Japanese policies and techniques, was that either Alaska or Hawaii were the area that would be subjected to attack at the hour that Ambassador Namura was to meet with the Secretary of State.

That ban, why would you initiate a surprise attack against Alaska, cancel that. The only logical explanation to people who were, let me say living, for months and years under this threat, the only logical explanation for that 1:00 meeting, with Secretary Hall was that an attack would take place around daylight and daylight in Hawaii was 1:00. Does that answer your question? Are you satisfied with that answer?

CAPT BEACH: [Comment on Bomb Plot]

I would like to add one point, Admiral. There was a specific action and series of messages translated into English and available in Washington which were never sent to Hawaii. These were what is known as the bomb plot messages sent by the Japanese naval intelligence officer under cover at the consulate in Honolulu, who had mapped out in accordance with instructions from Tokyo, had mapped out sectors in Pearl Harbor so that he could daily report the ships that were present and where they were located. This

was clearly in preparation for the attack. Those messages were never provided to any authorities in Hawaii because the person reviewing them in Washington and making the decision to send them or not, personally felt they were not important. That person was Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, in case anyone wants names.

DR. PRADOS: [on Bomb Plot messages]

This is true, but let me just say something about the bomb plot messages, because they're often taken to be more, I think than, imputed more to them than is necessarily the case. And that is, the bomb plot messages were designed to give a read out to Japanese high command of what combatant vessels were in Pearl Harbor at any given time. However, similar kinds of message were transmitted from Japanese intelligence people, and Japanese consuls, and Japanese officials, that many ports on the American West Coast, in the Philippines in Southeast Asia, in Panama, in South American, the same types of information. That's number one. Number two, Pearl Harbor obviously the site of the American Pacific Fleet, is a place where there are large numbers of combatants all the time. Large number of war ships all the time transitting through here. And number three, which is not usually thought of by analysts in this situation, in the 1930s and 1940s, the cable companies who were the ones who transmitted, did the physical transmission of these messages from one country to another, collected money depending upon the length of your message. So, they were spending money for every word in a message that was transmitting information of this sort. What the bomb plot messages did actually, was to set up a format, they were formatting messages. They set up a format wherein the Japanese spies at Pearl Harbor could transmit the information about warship presence and availability in a shorter form. Everyone who has looked at the bomb plot messages always thinks, well, the only reason they could have wanted this information was to plot a specific attack. But the fact is, the Japanese might have only been interested in saving money.

RADM MAC SHOWERS: [Comments]

I would like to comment on that. The question is that bomb plot messages and I would like to read you something in my handout. A total of 147 ships in harbor reports, were sent to Tokyo, 68 about Pearl Harbor, 55 about Manila, 18 about Panama, and 6 about Seattle. None of this was made known to Admiral Kimmel at all. He had no idea that there was twice as much interest in Pearl Harbor than there was in any other place. No that's not quite right. Sixty-eight against fifty-five, but in any case, much more about Pearl Harbor. Second interest was related to Manila, so it made sense, that had he had this information, he would have reacted much more strongly to what was going on in his immediate base. The fact is that he was totally cut out of the intelligence pattern all the way through. He was blank. He didn't have the magic machine and it was reported to Congress that indeed he did and, therefore, he was getting everything they were getting. That is simply not true. He was blank all the way. Yes, he was caught short.

ADM JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III: [Observations and question]

I think we are off on the fringes. I think we need to come back to the initial question both in the broad, most strategic perspective, and narrow it down some of this tremendous detail. I've heard things today presented in such a way that it is just a magnificent experience for me to hear it all and it's a question of getting it all together as Dave Richardson had said.

First, I think most of us agree that, Kimmel did not have the forces at Pearl Harbor that would enable him to sally with the Fleet from Pearl Harbor and take on the Japanese force that was attacking him. I think the figures were given that we were virtually outnumbered three to one, in terms of naval power. So, number one, it would appear that this didn't make good sense for Kimmel to go to sea.

Number two, I think it's made very clear to us that he didn't have the patrol aircraft to detect in sufficient time, Japanese, with reliability. Remember, we are talking about reliability. He didn't have a reliable assurance that he could detect a Japanese attack coming. So, I think most of us have come to the conclusion that the best way for him to defend against the Japanese surprise attack was to remain in Pearl Harbor and be ready. In fact, most of you have eluded to the fact that that's really where he fell down.

So many of the people in this room are Captains and Admirals, every one of you started out as an Ensign on board ship. What do you do when you are ready for combat? You go to general quarters. What does general quarters mean? It means that every officer and man on that ship is aboard the ship, they are alert, they are at battle stations, it means the magazines are open, and people are standing by to pass ammunition. That is the condition that the Fleet would have had to been in when the attack occurred at Pearl Harbor.

Does anybody agree with me, disagree with me, that that was the condition that we should have been in if we wanted to minimize the attack?

Well let's look at what occurs when you are in general quarters. It was our experience in World War II, and subsequently we have never had those long alerts, that you could keep people at GQ for about 8 or 9 hours and then the whole ship became less capable than if you were in Condition Three. Because it meant 100% of your crew was exhausted. You cannot keep people in general quarters for more than 8-12 hours. So the commanders, as a matter of fact, I think it was the second or third battle of Savo Island, you historians would know, we lost four cruisers and one of the reasons those cruisers were lost because the crew had been in general quarters forever. So the point I am trying to make is if the Fleet commander is told--I understand that this is the question that I want to ask--by people in Washington, we have broken the Japanese code. We will be able to tell you when an attack is eminent. So it goes through the Fleet commander's mind, if I'm going to know, have 12 hours, 4 hours, 2 hours notice, 2 hours isn't good enough because he's letting his people go ashore. But if I'm going to find out when the attack is going to be, I'm going to have every sailor back aboard those ships. I'm going to have them at GQ probably in the morning. Those of us in World War II, which we went to GQ in the morning remember, we went at the evening, because that's when the attacks were going

to occur. That's what the Fleet commander would have done had he known an attack was coming. We can't keep them at GQ all the time, but Washington said, I sent you a war message, it says anytime in the next year, we may go to war. We can't keep that at GQ for a year. We are going to give you a message that tells you when the attack is coming. That's what the Fleet commander depends upon, getting his alert message, so he can anty up to GQ, he is assured that would happen, and to my knowledge, he never got that message that he was promised by Washington, that he would get which would enable him to defend the Fleet.

So the decision he made, was a decision that I agree with Admiral Moorer, was the facts that I have portrayed, if they were essentially correct, that any responsible military commander would have to make. So may I ask Mr. Moderator, if anyone can tell me if I'm correct in assuming that Kimmel was told he would get warning of an impending attack and secondly, am I sure I understand that he did not get that sort of a message?

CAPT BEACH: [Responding to Admiral Holloway]

He got letters from Admiral Stark telling him specifically telling him that he would get such a message. Yes, he did.

ADM HOLLOWAY: [Comment]

I rest my case.

GEORGE VECTOR: [Question about General MacArthur]

George Vector, writing still another book on Pearl Harbor. When I was a Marine, I didn't wake up with the injunction that Captain Sequist asserted about Marines? Something went wrong at boot camp, maybe that's why I'm here now.

In addressing accountability, focus on accountability of Admiral Kimmel is what we are here for. What I don't see how, we can discuss his accountability evenhandedly without also discussing the accountability of General MacArthur and the senior leaders in Washington.

General MacArthur had the information and the warnings pretty much what Admiral Kimmel received and much more. He had the intelligence, he had access to the decrypted messages. He had more specific orders and if Admiral Kimmel's performance is considered poor, than General MacArthur's performance must be considered a disaster-atrocious.

The administration, the leaders in Washington said, that they had not received intelligence and that they didn't know that Pearl Harbor was going to be hit. Then they said they had received the intelligence, but it did not strike them as important. Then they said, when it was drawn to people's attention, it was ignored. When they were urged to send specific warnings on the basis of the intelligence, they resisted the urging

by their subordinate. Now, they should have accepted the idea that all of these things that I've just touched on in Washington, were blunders, errors, and the relatively few people who suggest that there was a purpose behind it, are dismissed as people who advance a conspiracy theory, which is an unfortunate term. I suggest that we consider the approach of the philosopher of history, Carl Fredrick, who argued in his book, *Pathology of Politics*, that everyday government is engaged in conspiracy and that it makes secret plans for secret purposes and carry them out in secret. Then they cover them up afterwards. This defines government operations throughout the world. To try to dismiss what was logical and reasonable, and I think justifiable, in strategic thinking in Washington, as conspiracy theory and sinister prevents our making an evenhanded judgement of accountability in Pearl Harbor and in Washington, and in everywhere else in connection with what happened on December 7th.

RADM BROOKS: [Concluding remarks and introduction of Admiral Chiles]

Thank you Mr. Vector, ladies and gentlemen, we are going to have to conclude on that note. Let me, before I introduce Admiral Chiles, take the prerogative of the moderator if you will (at least the prerogative of the guy who's got the microphone) and make a final observation if I may.

Without taking sides, or at least attempting not to take sides, I would just observe that there is a danger to oversimplifying this very complex issue. I think there is a great inclination on the part of those of us who are naval officers to just be rather dismissive in this regard. If he was in command, he is responsible. It is a much more complex issue than that. As Dave Rosenberg pointed out, this was a government-wide failure. In quoting Arleigh Burke, "certainly Admiral Kimmel might have done more. The fact of the matter is, Admiral Kimmel did quite a lot. The way life goes, there is always more that we could have done. Always there is more. No matter what he had done, there is always more that could have been done."

Surprisingly to me, we didn't spend an awful lot of time treating on the issue of was he fairly treated after the fact. We spent little time considering the various boards and course of inquiry that were convened, all but one of which were characterized by participants with terminology like "this was a star chamber proceeding." That is an issue surely not for today because we don't have the time, but for another consideration, because the issue of whether Admiral Kimmel's rank should be restored, hinges not only on what happened that day, but also on the American concept of fair play. In Randy Papadopoulos' words, the American concept of fair play is also a dimension of restoring the honor of the United States Navy, to the United States Army and the U.S. government as a whole. For they acted very dishonorably in several of those inquiries.

So with that as a final observation, work yet to be done, and perhaps, a subject for another symposium or another colloquium, let me introduce Admiral Hank Chiles who will sum up these proceedings.

Admiral Chiles graduated from the Naval Academy in 1960 and obtained his Masters Degree from Oxford University. He is a nuclear submariner. He served aboard four different submarines, commanded the fast attack submarine, USS *Greyling*. He was the senior naval officer on Admiral Rickover's staff, and later as a Flag officer, commanded all U.S. and NATO submarines in the Mediterranean. He was promoted to four stars in 1994, and appointed as Commander-in-Chief Strategic Command, the first naval officer to command the combined nuclear striking forces of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. Admiral Chiles retired in 1996, and is currently a Distinguished Professor of Leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy. Admiral Chiles:

ADM HENRY CHILES: [Summation]

It is an awesome responsibility to be the final speaker at this colloquium. But I applaud the Naval Historical Foundation for bringing these experts, these well-read personnel, together to review this topic. I am pleased to be here today. I appreciate Admiral Holloway's impassioned summation, which makes my job easier. I must tell you that I was exactly three years old on the day that Admiral Richardson was notified by Washington that Admiral Kimmel would relieve him on the 1st of February 1941. So this came as a great shock to Admiral Richardson who had argued forcefully with the President that the Pacific Fleet must not, must not, be decimated to support the effort in the European Theater.

That same month, the Secretary of the Navy had also expressed in writing his concern about the reduction of forces in the Pacific and Ambassador Drew had warned that the Japanese were planning an attack against Pearl Harbor. That warning was passed to Admiral Kimmel. So on this 58th anniversary of that attack, the images are burned either into our memory from the pictures we have seen, or what we have seen from the movies as we were growing up, as I did. Today, we heard eloquent and impassioned arguments on both sides. Those who support Admiral Kimmel's restoration of rank and retirement of four-stars, note the following: he was a hard working, thoughtful officer and protested the lack of military assets at his disposal.

Secondly, that President Roosevelt and his staff had reduced the strength of our naval forces in the Pacific and at Pearl Harbor and had diplomatically, stiff-armed the Japanese, goading the Japanese into attack. And I use the term stiff-armed deliberately since it represents a term borrowed from last Saturday's Centennial Victory.

So there is a potential here for a conspiracy at the very highest levels of our government or deliberate actions to weaken the Pacific forces at a crucial time in history. Additionally, it has been rigorously argued that failure to provide appropriate and time-sensitive intelligence to Admiral Kimmel--specifically, the Magic intercepts severely and vitally handicapped the Pacific command from fully understanding the military situations. It is alleged that the warnings were vague. That the bomb plot messages were not provided at all. In addition, Admiral Stark's communication methods to Admiral Kimmel via mail, vice picking up the secure telephone or utilizing messages contributed

to the aforementioned failure to provide intelligence. Hence the finger of fault points more towards Washington than Pearl Harbor.

Additionally, certain naval officers who were involved in investigating the attack at Pearl Harbor or who initially recommended that retired rank not be restored to Admiral Kimmel, recanted their position and sided with him. These personnel include Admiral Stanley who did not believe that Admiral Kimmel was treated fairly by the Roberts Investigation, Fleet Admiral King and Admiral Trost, among others.

Investigations have faulted others who are not accorded similar treatment as Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short. It has been pointed out that Admiral Kimmel was denied a fair hearing. His full rights were not afforded. Testimony against him was biased in some cases. And that this was a government-wide failure to quote Dave Rosenberg. Finally, it has been asserted that the military presence on Hawaii was ill-equipped to handle the Japanese strike force. Admiral Kimmel neither possessed the guns, the ammunition, the early warning aircraft, or defense. If the forces had been dispersed at sea, the loss of life may have been much worse. The Japanese professionally planned and executed an initial strike in Pearl Harbor with superior force. And the bottom line of that argument is: that the fault lies in Washington.

On the other hand, the following case has been made against restoration of four-star rank for Admiral Kimmel. Number one, both Admiral Kimmel and General Short retired voluntarily. They were the responsible commanders in Hawaii. They knew a surprise, aggressive move by the Japanese might occur, and that it might occur soon based on a war warning. Task force commanders, at least those of Admiral Kimmel's command, understood this before they left the island area. And as noted, the dispatch clearly said in "this dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Dave Richardson has pointed out that among other things, in the practices that were conducted before the attack on Pearl Harbor, that our Fleet practiced extensively on such an attack. An additional point is that no legal injustice has occurred in this case. There was no court martial. A three- or a four-star officer's permanent rank is that of two stars. The President nominates an officer for retirement at four stars and that confirmation is required by the Senate.

Loss of confidence is clear reason for an officer to be removed from command.

Errors of judgement were made in defense of Pearl Harbor and they resulted in extensive loss of life. The 2,395 Americans who lost their lives there, were of a total of some 2,403 personnel. A basic defense plan was not implemented. There was no push instituted by the Fleet commander to find the missing Japanese carrier force. The patrol aircraft were not upgraded, they were in the process of being upgraded, but there was no push to upgrade those aircraft for the mission of early warning.

And Admiral Kimmel had conversed with his intelligence chief, "you mean those carriers could be rounding Diamond Head now?"

Coordination and communications between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were weak. Hence, the forces at Pearl Harbor were not on full alert. The issue has been investigated nine times. The Secretaries of Defense and the Secretaries of the Navy did not recommend that rank at retirement be restored.

In conclusion, let me just say that throughout history, surprise has been an element of warfare. The Japanese had practiced it in force. And the fact that surprise happens should not be too surprising. But commanders must be ready always, not only, but especially when war is anticipated. To quote George Washington's farewell address in 1790, "most effectual means of keeping the peace is to be prepared for war." That we must always remember.

And so the debate concerning the mix of responsibility of Admiral Kimmel and of his seniors in Washington continues.

Without question, I think Admiral Kimmel did not have all of the available intelligence at his disposal that was available in Washington. At the same time, I repeat, officers serve at the pleasure of the President of the United States. Our commanders are today, and must always be, accountable and responsible for their actions and for their commands.

Ladies and gentlemen, the price of our liberty is eternal vigilance. That's been hammered into naval officers since they first walked into the gates of whatever institution they get their preparation to be officers in the United States Navy. And I'm sure the case is the same in the other services.

Our leadership in Washington and our leaders in the field, must always, always, keep that in mind.

Thank you very much.

VADM DUNN: [Closing remarks]

In his closing remarks VADM Dunn presented Naval Historical Foundation Truxtun Bowls to the speakers and panel and invited the participants and audience to observe a memorial ceremony that was to take place at the Lone Sailor statue at 1300. He then invited the participants and audience to convene over at the National Archives for refreshments and food and for continued discussion. Over at the Archives a microphone was set up and an energetic dialog ensued for two hours.

Appendices

- A. The Pearl Harbor Investigations (Provided by the Naval Historical Foundation)
- B. Cryptologic Background (Provided by Mr. Hatch)
- C. The Pearl Harbor Disaster: Washington's Intelligence Support Failure (Provided by VADM Richardson)
- D. The Bomb Plot Message (Provided by CAPT Beach)

The Pearl Harbor Investigations

Investigation/Inquiry: Knox Investigation

Initiator: Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox

Purpose: To determine the extent of the damage and, if possible, to find out why the attack had caught the Army and Navy forces on Oahu unawares.

Head Investigator: Secretary Knox

Dates of Investigation: 9-14 Dec 41

Summary of Findings: The Japanese air attack on the island of Oahu “was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the service...Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely.”

Investigation/Inquiry: Roberts Commission

Initiator: President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Purpose: To “ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese...upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941...to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned; and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.”

Head Investigator: Retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Owen J. Roberts

Other members: Retired Admiral William H. Standley and Rear Admiral Joseph W. Reeves; Major General Frank R. McCoy, USA (Retired) and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, USA.

Dates of Investigation: 18 Dec 41-23 Jan 42

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 2,173 pp.

Summary of Findings: The Roberts Commission noted that “the responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area [Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short], in fulfillment of their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted and used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate” and that the responsibility of the commanders “was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.” However, the commission determined that “these commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.” Concerning the naval forces at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the commission opined that its “state of readiness...was not such as required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.” Furthermore, the Commission believed that a sense of security derived from “opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military, and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East.” The existence of such a view, the commission held, “however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.” The Commission believed that “In the light of warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint

cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.” It should be noted Admiral Standley subsequently disassociated himself (in writing) from the findings because he did not believe Admiral Kimmel was treated fairly by Roberts.

Investigation/Inquiry: Hart Inquiry

Initiator: Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox

Purpose: “for an examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.”

Head Investigator: Admiral Thomas C. Hart (Retired)

Dates of Investigation: 12 Feb-15 Jun 1944

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 565 pp.

Summary of Findings: Hart recorded and preserved testimony to prevent its loss “by death or unavoidable absence.”

Investigation/Inquiry: Army Pearl Harbor Board

Initiator: Adjutant General of the War Department

Purpose: To “ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.”

Head Investigator: Lieutenant General George Grunert

Other members: Major Generals Henry D. Russell and Walter A. Frank

Dates of Investigation: 20 Jul 44 - 20 Oct 44.

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 3,357 pp.

Summary of Findings: Insofar as the Navy was concerned, the Army Board faulted the Navy for (1) failing to conduct long-range reconnaissance, (2) failing to inform General Short of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Marshalls/Gilberts in November 1941, (3) failing to inform General Short of a decrypted message that told of the Japanese destroying their codes and ciphers during the first week of December 1941, and (4) failing to advise General Short of the sinking of a Japanese midget submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941. Among the Army Board’s conclusions was that the inadequacies of the informal cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and General Short reflected a “general blindness to Japanese potentialities in the Central Pacific that was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster.” The Army report concluded that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were “not satisfactory, as a practical matter, though cordial.” However, the inquiry did not find General Short guilty of dereliction and found substantial fault with General Marshall. General Marshall and the Secretary of War both gave negative endorsements to the report, essentially refusing to accept the findings of the Board. Admiral Ernest J. King, commenting on the Army’s findings, believed that

Admiral Kimmel “and General Short should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did...”

Investigation/Inquiry: Navy Court of Inquiry

Initiator: Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal

Purpose: To “give its opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service” and, to and if that is the case, to “specifically recommend what further proceedings should be had” in the matter.

Head Investigator: Retired Admiral Orin G. Murfin

Other members: Retired Vice Admirals Edward C. Kalbfus and Adolphus Andrews

Dates of Investigation: 24 Jul - 19 Oct 44

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 1,397 pp.

Summary of Findings: The Navy Court of Inquiry opined that Admiral Kimmel took “adequate and effective” steps to put into effect “comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas...” In addition, it was realized that Admiral Kimmel neither possessed the aviation assets to carry out “daily, long-range all-around reconnaissance” nor had received any information “indicating that an attack was expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.” The Navy Court also criticized Admiral Stark’s failure “to display the sound judgment expected of him.” for failing to transmit, immediately, to Admiral Kimmel “important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and especially [on the morning of 7 December 1941]...the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.” The Court’s final opinion was that “no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.” Fleet Admiral King and the Secretary of the Navy both provided negative endorsements to the Court’s report, negating the effectiveness of the findings. Admiral King stated: “Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident.” King considered Admirals Stark and Kimmel “the responsible officers” in the matter, and evaluated the courses of actions they had taken. It should be noted that Admiral King recanted his position in 1948 and stated he was in error.

Investigation/Inquiry: Clarke Investigation/Inquiry: Clarke Investigation (Army)

Initiator: General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

Purpose: Review “the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled” in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack. Clarke’s inquiry concerned (1) the handling of intercepted Japanese message traffic (MAGIC), (2) handling of intelligence material by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, and (3) the handling of the message sent by General Marshall to Lieutenant General Short on the morning of 7 December 1941.

Head Investigator: Colonel Carter W. Clarke

Dates of Investigation: 14-16 Sep 44 and 13 Jul - 4 Aug 45

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 225 pp.

Investigation/Inquiry: Clausen Investigation (Army)

Initiator: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

Purpose: The work of the Army's Pearl Harbor Board needed to "be further continued," to conduct the supplementary investigation to obtain the "testimony of every witness in possession of material facts" concerning the Pearl Harbor attack.

Head Investigator: Major Henry C. Clausen, Judge Advocate General Division

Dates of Investigation: 23 Nov 44 - 12 Sep 45.

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 695 pp.

Investigation/Inquiry: Hewitt Inquiry

Initiator: Secretary of the Navy Forrestal

Purpose: That investigations directed by Public Law 339, 78th Congress (which had directed the Navy Court of Inquiry in 1944), should be continued "until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts should be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted."

Head Investigator: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt

Dates of Investigation: 14 May - 11 Jul 45

Length of Proceedings and Exhibits: 1,342 pp.

Summary of Findings: It is noteworthy that Hewitt faulted Admiral Stark for failing to pass on to Admiral Kimmel "important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation." Nevertheless, Hewitt concluded, Kimmel did have available to him "sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent..."

Investigation/Inquiry: Joint Congressional Committee

Dates of Investigation: 15 Nov 45 - 23 May 46

Length of report: 25,000 pp.

Summary of Findings: "Hawaiian commands failed (a) to discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle of command by mutual cooperation." The joint committee enumerated six additional areas in which the Hawaiian commands were at fault, concluding that the errors made by those commands (headed by Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short) were "errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty." The committee also faulted the Intelligence and War Plans divisions of the Navy and War Departments for their failure to appreciate the intelligence information they had gleaned from intercepted diplomatic message traffic and the failure to supply the Hawaiian commands with that information to aid the latter in assessing the gravity of the situation that led up to, and included, the events of 7 December 1941.

* * * * *

The Joint Congressional Committee report concluded a series of wartime investigations and hearings. Since then the issue of responsibility and accountability at

Pearl Harbor has been reexamined by the military, the media, and numerous authors and historians. On 27 April 1954, Chief of Naval Personnel Admiral J.L. Holloway, Jr. recommended that Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

In recent years the Kimmel family and others have worked to have Rear Admiral Kimmel promoted, posthumously, to four-star rank. Much of their efforts have concentrated on appealing to the Department of Defense and their elected representatives. Consequently, the Defense Department and the Navy has had to respond to several inquiries regarding the appropriateness of posthumous promotion.

Responding to a 1987 inquiry, then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost on 19 January 1988 stated "That no administration has bestowed [the] 'privilege' [of promotion to the highest grade held while on active duty] on Rear Admiral Kimmel may simply be an affirmation that, in terms of accountability, there is a vast difference between a degree of fault which does not warrant punitive action and a level of performance which would warrant bestowal of a privilege."

In 1991, both Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Secretary of the Navy Lawrence Garrett reviewed information provided by the Kimmel family and concluded that "the promotion process is not the way to address the issue [of Admiral Kimmel's] place in history."

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry noted in a letter to Edward R. Kimmel on 7 September 1994 that during the decades that followed the end of the war, none of the Presidents, Secretaries of Defense and Secretaries of the Navy had been persuaded that sufficient meritorious grounds existed to advance Rear Admiral Kimmel to Admiral on the retired list. Secretary Perry believed that Kimmel's status should not be changed, citing "society's legitimate interest in the finality of official actions, and by the weight, basis and scope of the prior judgments on this issue." Perry concluded that "while the bar of history may ultimately be more sympathetic" to the admiral "in the context of his times," he could not conclude that the admiral had been treated unjustly nor could he advocate a revision of the Navy's records.

On 10 December 1994 Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch reiterated that conclusion to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and added that the matter (Kimmel's posthumous promotion) had been given "the respectful, searching attention that it deserves."

The last official DoD review of the issue was completed 15 December 1995 by Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn. The **Dorn Report** responded to an inquiry made by Senator Strom Thurmond and advised the Secretary of Defense "whether actions taken against General Short and Admiral Kimmel were excessively harsh, and if so, whether posthumous advancement to three- and four-star rank [respectively] is the appropriate remedy."

In the report Dorn wrote, "I cannot conclude that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were victims of unfair official actions and thus I cannot conclude that the official remedy of advancement on the retirement list [is] in order. Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not have all the resources they felt necessary. Had they been provided more intelligence and clearer guidance, they might have understood their situation more clearly and behaved differently. Thus, responsibility for the magnitude of the Pearl Harbor disaster must be shared. But this is not a basis for contradicting the conclusion, drawn consistently over several investigations, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short committed errors of judgment. As commanders, they were accountable. Admiral Kimmel and General Short suffered greatly for Pearl Harbor. They lost men for whom they were responsible. They felt that too much blame was placed on them. Their children and grandchildren continue to be haunted by it all. For all this, there can be sadness. But there can be no official remedy."

Since the publication of Dorn report, the Kimmel family and others have continued to pursue the issue. Organizations that have called for exoneration include the VFW, Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, Admiral Nimitz Foundation, Naval Academy Alumni Association, Retired Officers Association, and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee. Several former Chiefs of Naval Operations as well as two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have spoken out in favor of posthumous promotion. It is significant to note that Admiral Trost counts himself among the former CNOs calling for exoneration, having changed his view on the issue in October 1994.

On 15 April 1999, Senator Roth of Delaware introduced Senate Joint Resolution 19 "Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department..." Co-sponsored by 22 Senators, the resolution cites passages from the numerous investigations and inquiries lamenting that others were not held accountable as well as citing Washington's failure to disclose vital information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short prior to the attack.

After a two-day debate, on 25 May the resolution passed in the Senate by a vote of 52-47. However, efforts to incorporate the resolution into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 failed as the legislation died in conference committee. Subsequently, on 7 October 1999, Congressmen Spratt, Spence and Skelton introduced H.R. 3050 "To provide for the posthumous advancement of Rear Admiral (retired) Husband E. Kimmel and Major General (retired) Walter C. Short on the retired lists of their respective services." In addition, a week later, Senators Roth, Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, Helms, Kerry, Domenici, Cochran, Hollings, Durbin, Murkowski, and Voinovich co-signed a letter to President Clinton urging him to correct a "longstanding wrong by advancing Admiral Kimmel and General Short to their highest grades of command during World War II."